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THE DOCTRINE OF PIERCING THE VEIL IN AN ERA OF
MULTIPLE LIMITED LIABILITY ENTITIES: AN
OPPORTUNITY TO CODIFY THE TEST FOR WAIVING
OWNERS' LIMITED-LIABILITY PROTECTION
John H. Matheson* & Raymond B. Ebyt
Abstract: The use of the corporate form of business organization has always provided a
firm's owners/shareholders with a presumptive shield from personal liability for the debts of
the business. Case-by-case exceptions to this limited-liability shield have developed in each
state under the general rubric of "piercing the veil." Courts and commentators alike have
noted the vagueness of the piercing analysis and have questioned the appropriateness of some
of the factors employed in that analysis. In addition, new forms of business entities, such as
limited liability companies and limited liability partnerships, have been legislatively created
over the past several decades, raising the issue of whether and by what standards their limited-
liability shields will be pierced. This is an opportune time to reexamine the piercing doctrine
and to provide a uniform standard for all forms of limited liability entities. The authors
propose a Model Statute to replace the current common-law doctrine for determining when
piercing will take place. Under the Model Statute, piercing is limited to situations in which the
business owner (1) misrepresents the assets of the business, (2) engages in self-dealing
transactions, or (3) takes assets from the business under circumstances that render the
business insolvent. In the latter two situations, the owner's liability is limited to the amount
received by the owner in excess of the value given in return unless the owner knew or should
have foreseen that the transfer would result in the insolvency of the business.
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Piercing the Veil
"The whole problem of the relation between [owners and their]
corporations is one that is still enveloped in the mists of metaphor.
Metaphors in law are to be narrowly watched, for starting as
devices to liberate thought, they end often by enslaving it. "'
"Do you notice anything intellectually disturbing about this
[standard piercing-the-corporate-veil] formulation? That's right;
IT'S vague. It hardly gives you any concrete idea about which
conduct does or does not trigger the doctrine-not enough of an
idea, at least, to give you the ability to counsel clients in a
meaningful way. "2
I. INTRODUCTION
Use of the corporate form for the operation of a business
presumptively shields the personal assets of the owners/shareholders
from the claims of the business's creditors.3 A court may be asked to
ignore this liability shield when a voluntary or involuntary creditor4 finds
the corporation unable to pay its debts.' The creditor would like the court
to disregard or "pierce" the statutory limited-liability shield so that the
debts might be satisfied out of the owners/shareholders' assets, personal
or otherwise.6 Absent a judicial decision to "pierce the corporate veil" in
this manner, the limited liability created by the applicable corporate
statute stays intact and the creditor must shoulder the loss.
The initial quote above by Justice Benjamin Cardozo in 1926 in a
piercing case was prophetic: the concept of "piercing the corporate veil"
has become largely divorced from, and ignorant of, both the purposes
1. Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry., 155 N.E. 58, 61 (N.Y. 1926) (Cardozo, J.).
2 Robert Charles Clark, Corporate Law 38 (1986).
3. See, e.g., Revised Model Bus. Corp. Act § 6.22(b) (1996) ("Unless otherwise provided in the
articles of incorporation, a shareholder of a corporation is not personally liable for the acts or debts
of the corporation .... .'). See generally John H. Matheson & Brent A. Olson, A Callfor a Unified
Business Organization Law, 65 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1, 5-9 (1996).
4. "Involuntary creditor" will be used throughout this Article to mean those creditors who did not
enter into a debtor-creditor relationship of their own free will. The clearest example of this category
would be a person against whom the limited liability entity (LLE) committed some tortious act, such
as negligent injury of a pedestrian by a company delivery-truck driver.
5. See generally Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76
Cornell L. Rev. 1036 (1991).
6. The theory of piercing applies both to the situation where the owner or owners are individuals
and where the owner is another entity, typically a corporation with a wholly owned subsidiary.
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behind limiting liability and the legitimate reasons for disregarding that
limit. The second quote, from Dean Robert Clark of Harvard Law School
sixty years later, confirms Cardozo's prophecy and is a fair assessment of
the state of this area of the law today.
That the piercing doctrine is lost in a fog is generally recognized.7
Courts will pierce the corporate veil, subjecting business owners to
potentially ruinous liabilities because the corporation did not observe
irrelevant procedures enacted only to protect shareholders8 or because
owners exercised control over corporations commensurate with their
ownership interest.9 In one recent case, the trial court justified its
decision to pierce the corporate veil on the mere ground that the sole
shareholder signed a piece of corporate letterhead-as president-
acknowledging the corporation's debt.'°
This desultory state of the common law would itself be reason enough
for clarification or reform. Business owners have never had much
guidance regarding what activities will result in a loss of limited liability.
The stakes are much more significant today, however, as presumptive
limited liability for business owners has become the norm through the
proliferation of new forms of limited liability entities (LLEs)." The issue
of when limited liability will be lost must now be addressed for these
new forms of LLEs as well as for corporations. As if the vagaries of the
piercing doctrine were not enough, the business counsel now faces the
specter of a different common-law piercing test being developed for each
distinct type of LLE within each state.
7. See, e.g., Phillip I. Blumberg, The Law of Corporate Groups: Procedural Problems in the Law
of Parent and Subsidiary Corporations 8 (1983) (suggesting that court decisions are "irreconcilable
and not entirely comprehensible"); Clark, supra note 2, at 72 ("[Ihe courts usually forgo any
sustained attempt at a remedial theory or even a coherent exposition of the basis of liability, although
descriptive summaries are occasionally attempted."); Frank Easterbrook & Daniel Fischel, The
Economic Structure of Corporate Law 54-55 (1984) ("[T]ests used by courts-whether a
corporation has a 'separate mind of its own,' whether it is a 'mere instrumentality,' and so forth-are
singularly unhelpful.").
8. See, e.g., Laya v. Erin Homes, Inc., 352 S.E.2d 93, 99 (W. Va. 1986).
9. See, e.g., Janos v. Murduck, 672 N.E.2d 1021, 1024-25 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996).
10. See G & S Elec. v. Soha, No. 18665, 1998 WL 488785 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 5, 1998). The
trial court actually granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, piercing the corporate veil,
but the appellate court reversed and remanded for trial. See id. at *2.
11. The term "LLE" will be used throughout this Article to apply universally to those statutorily
created entities wherein all the owners are statutorily afforded limited liability. This includes
primarily corporations, limited liability companies (LLCs), and limited liability partnerships (LLPs).
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The advent of these new forms of LLEs offers an opportunity both to
clarify and to simplify this area of the law by shedding new light on the
reasons for giving owners limited liability and for taking it away. The
widespread acceptance of these new LLE forms dispels the long
association between passivity and limited liability, which spawned the
convoluted piercing doctrine in the first place. The concept of limited
liability becomes understandable as purely a means for promoting
commercial activity an4 its benefits.
Part II of this Article addresses the creation and expansion of both
limited liability and the development of the new forms of LLEs. Part III
analyzes the tests currently used by courts to determine whether to pierce
the limited-liability veil. These tests often consist largely of laundry lists
of irrelevant factors that the courts recite without analysis or
justification. 2 At best, these "totality of the circumstances" types of
analyses reflect a case-by-case assessment of the equities of each
individual situation. At worst, they impose onerous burdens on an
owner"3 whose only culpable act is the failure of the business. In an
attempt to make some sense of the decisions in this area, scholars are left.
to such devices as cataloguing cases by types of plaintiffs and claims 4 or
comparing lists of factors used by the courts."5
Part IV proposes a new Model Statute governing when owners of all
forms of LLEs lose limited-liability protections. The statute would have
universal applicability to corporations as well as other forms of LLEs,
such as limited liability partnerships and limited liability companies.
6
The proposed statute would serve as an overlay, applying to each type of
12. The Laya court stated:
Most of the numerous factors listed previously are pertinent primarily to the disregard of
formalities requirement, not because it is the more important requirement-it is not-but
because it is easier to compile a list of typical corporate formalities than to anticipate and list
types of inequitable and unfair consequences which could result from not piercing the corporate
veil in a given case.
Laya, 352 S.E.2d at 99.
13. The singular term "owner" will be used throughout the Article, though this analysis will apply
equally to multiple owners acting in concert as well.
14. See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 5, at 1047-66
15. See, e.g., Mark A. Olthoff, Beyond the Form-Should the Corporate Veil Be Pierced?, 64 U.
Mo. Kan. City L. Rev. 311,313-14 (1995).
16. Robert Keatinge recently coined the term "universal statute" to mean a statute that applies
across multiple forms of business entity but still relates to the characteristics or operations of those
entities. Robert R. Keatinge, Universal Business Organization Legislation: Will It Happen? Why and
When, 23 Del. . Corp. L. 29,32 (1998).
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LLE despite the underlying organizational statute and could be adopted
at either the state or federal level."
The proposed Model Statute would radically change the jurisprudence
of piercing law. Adoption of a single, statutory set of standards for loss
of limited liability would bring significant certainty to this area of the
law. Courts addressing the issue of piercing for any form of LLE would
apply a consistent test, eliminating free-form decisionmaking.
Lack of honesty in form and in substance should be the sole reason'8
for waiving statutory limited liability. The proposed test eliminates
limited-liability protection whenever an owner acts in a way that
misleads creditors as to the assets available to satisfy the debts of the
business. This loss of limited liability will result from the voluntary acts
of the owner and in a very real sense can be said to be waived by the
owner's actions. More fundamentally, the test will serve as a mechanism
by which counselors for small businesses can advise: "Dishonesty in the
conduct of your business is the only way you can be personally liable.
Conduct your business in an honest manner and you can be assured of
the protection of statutory limited liability."
Under the proposed test, an owner waives statutory limited liability by
participating in any of three types of activities: (1) fraud; (2) transfers of
LLE assets' 9 in exchange for property contributed or services rendered
by the owner for less than reasonably equivalent value; or (3) distribution
of money or other property of the LLE to the owner that renders the LLE
insolvent.20 The circumstances surrounding the particular type of waiver
dictate the extent of the owner's liability.
17. There are a variety of factors that would go into this determination. One consideration,
commercial uniformity, urges adoption at the federal level, especially as business activity is often
undertaken at a national or international level. On the other side, businesses involved in piercing
claims are often smaller, local enterprises. Additionally, much can be said for allowing individual
states to experiment with variations of the Model Statute.
18. Specific legislative enactments, however, such as environmental-liability laws, may also
impose liability directly on the owners. See, e.g., Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(35), 9607(a)(1) (1994) (making
owner of facility where hazardous substance is found responsible for cleanup); Lynda J. Oswald,
Strict Liability of Individuals Under CERCLA: A Normative Analysis, 20 B.C. Envtl. Aft. L. Rev.
579 (1993).
19. Incurring debt would be considered such a transfer.
20. The transfer of assets or profits might also be made to entities in which the owner has an
interest. This standard is not entirely new, but is borrowed in part from the Unif Fraudulent
Conveyances Act (1918) § 4. 7AII U.L.A. 67 (1995). The possible application of concepts
developed under fraudulent conveyance law in particular and bankruptcy law in general were well
Vol. 75:147, 2000
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Part V reviews the operation of the test in greater detail, but it may be
briefly summarized at this point. In the first instance, when an owner
commits fraud or uses the LLE to commit fraud with respect to any
material portion of the assets owned by or available to the LLE's
creditors, the owner should be liable for the entire debts of the LLE.
Several principles underlying the LLE compel this result: providing
confidence to LLE creditors that the assets available for satisfaction of
LLE debts actually exist, discouraging fraud in a business setting through
somewhat punitive sanctions, and, lastly, making defrauded creditors
whole. In addition, the high likelihood that the fraud is causally related to
the creditor's harm suggests that creditors need not specifically show that
the fraud caused their harm.
Absent fraud, an LLE owner will waive limited-liability protection
when the owner transfers assets of the LLE either to the owner or to
entities in which the owner has an interest, in exchange for less valuable
property or services. Finally, transfers of an LLE's assets to either the
owner or to entities in which the owner has an interest that render the
LLE unable to pay its debts in the ordinary course of business will also
waive the owner's limited liability. Unless the creditor can demonstrate
that these payments resulted in the failure of the business, however, the
owner is liable only for the excess of a reasonable amount. By limiting
the owner's exposure to such finite claims in unreasonable-transfer cases,
the test allows creditors some recovery when the owner engages in self-
dealing while still acknowledging ordinary business practices.
II. EVOLUTION OF LIMITED LIABILITY FOR BUSINESS
OWNERS
A. Limited Liability and Modern Capital Accumulation
The recognition of the existence of an incorporate person necessarily
involves the recognition of the three following principles: (1) a
corporation is a person distinct from its members; (2) the property of the
corporation is distinct from the property of its members; and (3) the
property of its members cannot be taken in execution for the debt of the
corporation, and vice versa.2'
discussed by Professor Clark before new LLE forms demonstrated the increased applicability of
these principles to LLEs. See Clark, supra note 2, ch. 2.
21. See 3 William Holdsworth, A History ofEnglish Law 482 (1942).
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Traditionally, business owners have had to choose between two basic
forms of business entities, and in doing so, had to choose between active
participation or limited liability. The classic sole proprietorship or
general partnership contemplates one or a small group of business
owners that actively participate in the business.22 While they enjoy
control over the business, these owners face the prospect of unlimited
personal liability for the obligations of the business, except as may be
limited by insurance or agreement. The personal assets of sole
proprietors and general partners remain unprotected and exposed to
attachment by creditors.23
In contrast, the traditional advantage of doing business in the
corporate form was the ability of business owners/shareholders to limit
their personal liability to their actual and promised contributions.
Business creditors must look to corporate assets for satisfaction of
claims. Creditors generally cannot proceed against the owners' personal
assets because the corporate entity shields them from loss. 2
4
Generations of business counselors have focused on finding a way to
obtain the best of both the partnership and corporate forms. To obtain
limited-liability protection, closely held businesses that once might have
operated as sole proprietorships or general partnerships began to
incorporate.2 ' By limiting responsibility for corporate actions to the
assets of the corporation while immunizing the owners' personal assets,
corporations can attract other owners whose risk of loss is limited by the
amount of capital contributed to the corporation.
American law governing corporate limited liability, however, has had
a contentious history. In the 1800s, Thomas Cooper described limited
22. See Revised Unif. Partnership Act §§ 301, 306, 401, 404, 6 U.L.A. 33-34, 45, 51-52, 58-59
(1995) (providing that all partners are agents of partnership, bear joint and several liability for
partnership obligations, share profits and losses equally, have equal rights to manage partnership,
and owe each other general fiduciary duties of loyalty); Unif. Partnership Act §§ 9, 15, 18(a), 18(e),
21, 6 U.L.A. 400-01, 456, 526, 608 (1995).
23. See Revised Unif. Partnership Act §§ 306-308, 6 U.L.A. 45, 46-47, 49-50 (1995); Unif.
Partnership Act §§ 15-16, 6 U.L.A. 456, 501 (1995).
24. See, e.g., Revised Model Bus. Corp. Act § 6.22(b) (1996) ("Unless otherwise provided in the
articles of incorporation, a shareholder of a corporation is not personally liable for the acts or debts
of the corporation .... "); cf Revised Unif. Ltd. Partnership Act § 403 (amended 1985), 6 U.L.A.
177 (1995) (providing that in limited partnership only general partners are personally liable for debts
to third parties).
25. See generally Lawrence E. Mitchell, Close Corporations Reconsidered, 63 Tul. L. Rev. 1143,
1147 n.10 (1989) (emphasizing that limited liability is "[the] major reason small business persons
choose to incorporate").
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liability as a "mode of swindling, quite common and honourable in these
United States" and "a fraud on the honest and confiding part of the
public."26 Yet, early in the twentieth century, President Butler of
Columbia University acclaimed limited liability as "the greatest single
discovery of modem times" and that "even steam and electricity are far
less important than the limited liability corporation, and they would be
reduced to comparative impotence without it."27
Until the early to mid-1800s, legislation in both England and the United
States imposed strict limits on an owner's ability to incorporate and to
receive the benefits of limited liability.28 Incorporation typically required a
special act of Parliament or a state legislature.29 State legislatures enacting
general corporation statutes usually imposed substantial limitations on
corporations, including minimum paid-in capital requirements, limited
permissible purposes, and limited duration." As corporations began to
dominate the economic landscape, however, legislatures have removed
nearly all of the original limitations on the ability of corporations to
organize and operate.3
Following the Industrial Revolution, capital-intensive businesses
required substantial expenditures beyond the means of the typical
entrepreneur, requiring the infusion of outside investment.32 Granting
limited liability to those who contributed capital encouraged investment
because people could invest without risking their full personal net worth.
The development of modem capital markets depended on limited
liability because, although investors may be willing to risk their entire
net worth in businesses they themselves operate, they are not willing-
absent limited liability-to invest in businesses that they do not operate
or closely monitor. Limited liability continues to enable venture
26. Herbert Hovenkamp, Enterprise and American Law 1836-1937, at 50 (1991) (quoting
Thomas Cooper, Lectures on the Elements of Political Economy 247, 250 (2d ed. 1830)) (footnote
omitted).
27. Stephen B. Presser, Piercing the Corporate Veil § 1.01, at 1-5 (1999) (citation omitted).
28. See Kenneth K. Luce, Trends in Modern Corporation Legislation, 50 Mich. L. Rev. 1291,
1293-94 (1952) (describing how "corporate charters were difficult and expensive to obtain, the fruit
of special privilege"); see also Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of
Corporate Theory, 88 W. Va. L. Rev. 173, 208-09 (1985) ("It is not usually appreciated that truly
limited shareholder liability was far from the norm in America even as late as 1900.").
29. See Harry G. Henn & John R. Alexander, Laws of Corporations § 12, at 24-25 (3d ed. 1983).
30. See id. at 25-26.
31. Seeid. at 26-32.
32. See generally Hovenkamp, supra note 26, at 49-55 (describing postindustrial era shift toward
limited liability for shareholders calculated to facilitate infusion of capital into new businesses).
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capitalists and casual investors to invest in diverse enterprises without
incurring the excessive costs necessary to monitor each enterprise
closely.33
Corporate law, while securing limited liability, provides that corporate
power must be exercised according to certain mandatory rules that
"govern defined issues in a manner that cannot be varied by corporate
actors."34 Most importantly, all corporations presumptively must have a
board of directors that acts as the central governance group.35 The
owners/shareholders elect the board of directors that makes business
policy and manages the corporate enterprise,36 resulting in a representa-
tive, as opposed to democratic, governance structure.
The grant of limited liability to corporate investors advances econom-
ic policies by encouraging a broader base of passive participants in
business investment.37 Current corporate codes separate ownership and
control. Traditional thinking linked the limited liability given to investors
33. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 7, at 41-42. (reasoning that limited liability
encourages investor diversification and discourages close monitoring of each individual investment).
34. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1461, 1461
(1989) (footnote omitted); see Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89
Colum. L. Rev. 1549, 1553-54 n.16 (1989) (enumerating Delaware's mandatory rules). But cf.
Roberta Romano, Answering the Wrong Question: The Tenuous Case for Mandatory Corporate
Laws, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1599, 1599-602, 1616 (1989) (contesting Professor Gordon in part and
arguing that although many "mandatory" rules may be avoided, some may be desirable "when
externalities are present").
35. See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 141(a) (Michie 1991) (stating that board of directors is
required unless otherwise provided in certificate of incorporation); Revised Model Bus. Corp. Act
§§ 8.01 (establishing that board of directors is required unless all shareholders agree to
nontraditional form of governance), 8.03 (stating number and election of directors) (1996).
36. See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 141(a); Revised Model Bus. Corp. Act § 8.01 (establishing
that business and affairs of corporations shall be managed by or under direction of board of
directors). Corporate law requires shareholders to elect the board of directors through regularly
scheduled annual elections. See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 211(b) (Michie 1991) ("An annual
meeting of stockholders shall be held for the election of directors on a date and at a time designated
by or in the manner provided in the bylaws."); Revised Model Bus. Corp. Act § 7.01(a) (1996) ("A
corporation shall hold a meeting of shareholders annually at a time stated in or fixed in accordance
with the bylaws."). To provide accountability, perpetual directorships are often banned. See
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 7, at 3 (noting that "[s]tates almost uniformly forbid perpetual
directorships").
37. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Liability for Corporate Torts,
100 Yale L.J. 1879, 1879 (1991) (observing that limited liability "create[s] incentives for excessive
risk-taking by permitting corporations to avoid the full costs of their activities"); David W. Leebron,
Limited Liability, Tort Victims, and Creditors, 91 Colum. L. Rev. 1565, 1566 (1991) (describing
"the traditional corporate and economic justifications for limited liability" as "the need to encourage
investment in productive, albeit risky, activities").
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with a governance structure in which they were presumptively passive.
The directors, not the shareholders, can be held personally liable for their
actions in managing the corporation. If a shareholder also serves as a
director, personal liability may be imposed for the shareholder/director's
actions as a director, not because of his or her status as a shareholder.
B. Double Taxation and the Development ofNew Forms ofLLEs
1. The Kintner Four-Factor Test
The main downside with the use of the corporate form has been its
unattractive tax treatment. Until 1997, the Internal Revenue Code (Code)
created a dichotomy between corporations and partnerships. The Code
imposed a two-tier structure of taxation on corporations,38 while treating
partnerships as mere aggregations of their partners not separately taxable
as a business entity.39
Classifying an entity for tax purposes as either a partnership or a
corporation was therefore of central importance to choice-of-entity
concerns. Generally, corporations were subject to entity-level taxation
while partnerships were entitled to pass-through treatment.4 Under this
treatment, partnership income is attributed to the partners and not the
partnership. Thus, the partnership itself is not taxed.4' Similarly, losses
and tax credits also pass through to the partners4 even in the absence ofpartnership income or tax on that income.43
38. See Boris L Bittker & James S. Eustice, The Federal Income Taxation of Corporations and
Shareholders 1.01, at 1-2 to 1-5 (6th ed. 1994); James S. Eustice et al., The Tax Reform Act of
1986: Analysis and Commentary 2.02 (1987) (discussing history of corporate tax rates); Robert
Charles Clark, The Morphogenesis of Subchapter C: An Essay in Statutory Evolution and Reform, 87
Yale L. 90, 90-94 (1977) (discussing development of corporate tax culture and proposing reform
package); Maijorie E. Komhauser, Corporate Regulation and the Origins of the Corporate Income
Tax, 66 Ind. L.J. 53, 53-55 (1990) (discussing development and significance of corporate excise
tax).
39. See Robert W. Hamilton, Fundamentals ofModern Business 294 (1989) ("Partnerships ... are
not treated as separate taxable entities."); Kimberly K. Francev, The Fate of the Fully-Divested
Lower-Tier Partnership: Does the IRS Recognize the Body?, 6 DePaul Bus. L.J. 201, 202-07 (1994)
(concluding that "partners [are] liable for income tax only in their separate or individual capacities");
Donald J. Weidner, A Perspective to Reconsider Partnership Law, 16 Fla. St U. L. Rev. 1, 4-10
(1988) (comparing entity versus aggregate approach to partnership taxation).
40. See Hamilton, supra note 39, at 294.
41. See IL.C. § 701 (1994).
42. See LIUC. § 702 (1994).
43. The limitation on the use of passive-activity losses and credits under Code § 469 is applied at
the partner level. See I.RC. § 469 (1994), amended by Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996,
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In contrast, a corporation is subject to double taxation:' it is taxed
once as an entity,45 and its shareholders are taxed on distributions of
dividends, which are treated as ordinary income.46 Moreover, because
corporate losses do not pass through to the shareholders, such losses
cannot be used to offset the shareholders' other income. 47 Retained
earnings escape double taxation only temporarily; the profits generated
by these retained earnings are taxed at the corporate level.48 Moreover,
these earnings are taxed again at the shareholder level either when they
are distributed or when the shares are sold by a shareholder.49
Until 1997, the IRS decided whether to impose a double tax on other
forms of business organizations on the basis of the organizational
characteristics of the particular business. Under treasury regulations
adopted in 1960, four attributes or characteristics determined whether a
business would be treated as a partnership for federal income tax
purposes or as an association subject to the corporate double taxi ° These
attributes, known as the Kintner factors,5' were (1) continuity of life,
(2) centralized management, (3) limited liability, and (4) free transfer-
ability of interests. 2 To avoid double or entity tax status, a business
Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1704(d)(1), (e)(1), 110 Stat. 1755, 1878-79 (1996) (codified in scattered
sections of 26 U.S.C.) [hereinafter SBJPA of 1996].
44. See I.R.C. §§ 301-381 (Subchapter C) (1994) (imposing a double tax on corporations),
amended by ICC Termination Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-88, § 304(c), 109 Stat. 803, 944, and
SBJPA of 1996, supra note 43, § 1702(h)(7), 110 Stat. at 1874; cf. I.R.C. §§ 1361-1375 (1994)
(Subchapter S) (imposing single tax on certain closely held corporations), amended by SBJPA of
1996, supra note 43, 110 Stat. 1755.
45. See I.R.C. § 11 (1994).
46. See I.R.C. § 61(a)(7) (1994) (establishing that "gross income means all income from whatever
source derived, including.., dividends...").
47. See Alvin C. Warren, Jr., American Law Inst., Integration ofthe Individual and Corporate
Income Taxes: Reporter's Study of Corporate Income Tax Integration 1-12 (1993).
48. See id.
49. See id. The entity theory was the original basis for imposing a separate corporate tax. See
Mervyn King, Public Policy and the Corporation 50 (1977) (discussing "the concept of separate
taxation of the company and its shareholders").
50. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(1) (1960), replaced by Check the Box Regulations, Treas.
Reg. § 301.7701 (1996). Effective January 1, 1997, the Treasury Department replaced the Kintner
Regulations, see infra notes 51-53 and accompanying text, with the Check the Box Regulations. See
infra notes 104-11 for a discussion of the Check the Box Regulations.
51. See United States v. Kintner, 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954).
52. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(1), replaced by Check the Box Regulations, Treas. Reg.
§ 301.7701. The regulations were enacted in response to Kintner, which held that an association's
tax status was determined by its corporate characteristics. See Kintner, 216 F.2d at 418-19. Free
transferability of interests exists if each of the owners of the organization-or those owners owning
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organization other than a corporation could have no more that two of
these characteristics.53 This four-factor corporate-characteristic test
inspired alternative forms of business entities and fueled the adoption of
new business entity organization laws that sought both to limit liability
and to avoid double taxation.
2. Efforts to Resolve the Limited-Liability/Double-Tax Dilemma
The tensions and trade-offs inherent in the quest to achieve limited
liability without double taxation have fueled the creation of numerous
hybrids of the corporation and the general partnership. These hybrid
entities, as attempts at the ideal form of business organization, more or
less form a continuum between the pure general partnership and the pure
corporation. Although this Article focuses on the main forms of such
"substantially all" of the interests-has the power, without the consent of other owners, to transfer
the ownership interest in a manner that substitutes the transferee for the owner. Treas. Reg.
§ 301.7701-2(e)(1) (1960), replaced by Check the Box Regulations, Treas. Reg. § 301.7701. Such
consent may take the form of consent by a majority of owners or consent by a particular owner. See,
e.g., Rev. Rul. 93-92, 1993-2 C.B. 318, 320-21 (concluding that Oklahoma limited liability
company lacked free transferability of interests because transfer required consent of majority of
remaining capital interests). The regulations make clear that free transferability of interests exists
only when it is possible to transfer all the rights of the interest owner. See Treas. Reg.
§ 301.7701-2(e) (1960), replaced by Check the Box Regulations, Treas. Reg. § 301.7701. If the
owner may freely transfer only economic rights, flee transferability is not present. See Treas. Reg.
§ 301.7701-2(e), replaced by Check the Box Regulations, Treas. Reg. § 301.7701. Revenue
Procedure 95-10 follows this division by stating that the IRS will generally rule that flee transferability
of interests is lacking when a member does not have the power to transfer "all the attributes" of the
member's interest without consent. Rev. Proc. 95-10 § 5.02(2), 1995-1 C.B. 501,504.
53. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(3) (1960), replaced by Check the Box Regulations, Treas.
Reg. § 301.7701. This four-factor test originated in Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344, 345,
359-60 (1935), which involved the federal income tax classification of an organization formed as a
trust under state law. The Supreme Court in Morrissey emphasized the trust's freely transferable
"share certificates," and it ruled that the trust resembled a corporation and therefore should be
classified as an association taxable as a corporation. Id. at 360. The Court based its decision on the
various characteristics that distinguish associations taxable as corporations from trusts and
partnerships, hinging tax classification on the structural and operational resemblance of the subject
entity rather than on any policy goal that might be achieved by the classification. See id. at 360-61.
In Kintner, a physician formed an association of physicians under the rubric of a general
partnership, seeking association classification taxable as a corporation, thus enabling the
organization to establish a qualified corporate pension plan for the benefit of its employees. See
Kintner, 216 F.2d at 418-19. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the organization
had sufficient corporate characteristics to qualify as an association taxable as a corporation and
therefore the organization was able to avail itself of the benefits of corporate pension tax law. See id.
at 428.
The Treasury responded to Kintner by proposing new regulations in 1959 that were modified and
adopted in 1960 as final regulations. See T.D. 6503, 1960-2 C.B. 409-25.
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alternative entities, only the creativity and risk adversity of the crafter
limit the potential variations. The acceptance of these new forms has
caused the gradual relaxation of the restrictions that once required
business owners to be passive investors to obtain limited liability.
a. S Corporations
Congress adopted Subchapter S to address the double-tax/limited-
liability dilemma by affording certain small business corporations
partnership-like tax treatment. 4 Congress also believed that Subchapter S
would reduce the tax law's impact on the choice of business form."
Although S corporations receive the benefit of pass-through taxation,
they must give up some of the flexibility the corporate form affords. 6
S-corporation status restricts the number and identity of permissible
shareholders57 and imposes a "one class of stock" ownership require-
ment. 8 Thus, the resulting regulations restrict the availability of conduit
54. See S. Rep. No. 85-1983, at 68 (1958), reprinted in 1958-3 C.B. 922, 1008-09. In August
1996, the Small Business Job Protection Act became law. See SBJPA of 1996, supra note 43, 110
Stat. 1755. The SBJPA of 1996 was effective beginning January 1, 1997. See SBJPA of 1996, supra
note43, 110 Stat. 1755.
55. See Susan Kalinka, The Limited Liability Company and Subchapter S: Classification Issues
Revisited, 60 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1083, 1086-87 (1992).
56. See I.R.C. §§ 1361-1378 (1994), amended by SBJPA of 1996, supra note 43, 110 Stat 1755.
57. See I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1)(A)-(C), amended by SBJPA of 1996, supra note 43, §§ 1301,
1316(a)(1), 110 Stat. at 1785-86. Prior to enactment of the SBJPA of 1996, in order to qualify for
S-corporation tax treatment, a corporation could not have more than 35 shareholders. See I.R.C.
§ 1361(b)(1)(A), amended by SBJPA of 1996, supra note 43, § 1301, 110 Stat. at 1777. The SBJPA
of 1996 increases the maximum number of eligible shareholders from 35 to 75. See SBJPA of 1996,
supra note 43, § 1301, 110 Stat. at 1777. An S corporation may not have a shareholder-other than
a trust-who is not an individual. See I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1)(B), amended by SBJPA of 1996, supra
note 43, § 1316(a)(1), 110 Stat. at 1785-86. Similarly, the corporation may not have owners who are
nonresident aliens. See I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1)(C). This limitation poses significant barriers for offshore
joint ventures.
58. See I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1)(D). S corporations may not be members of affiliated groups and may
not have more than one class of stock. See I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1)(D), (2)(A), amended by SBJPA of
1996, supra note 43, § 1308(a), 110 Stat. at 1782. The restrictions limit estate-planning options.
With S corporations, it is impossible to create two classes of stock having different management and
dividend rights for parent and child. See I.RC. § 1361(b)(1)(D). The restrictions also cause problems
when investors contribute different types of assets or have different investment expectations. For
example, with S corporations it is impossible to create one class of stock paying fixed high dividends
and another class of stock paying low dividends but enjoying capital appreciation. See I.RC.
§ 1361(b)(1)(D); Richard L. Parker, Corporate Benefits Without Corporate Taxation: Limited
Liability Company and Limited Partnership Solutions to the Choice of Entity Dilemma, 29 San
Diego L. Rev. 399, 421 n.103 (1992).
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taxation by adding another level of relatively arbitrary organizational
attributes that a business must meet to satisfy the Subchapter S criteria."
The Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996 (SBJPA of 1996),60
among other things, increased the maximum number of eligible
shareholders from thirty-five to seventy-five,6 allowed "electing small
business trust[s]" to hold S-corporation stock,62  and allowed
S corporations to own eighty percent or more of other corporations.'
Although an improvement, these changes left untouched the basic
problems. First, while expanding the potential applicability of
Subchapter S, the changes did not lessen the complexity of tax law as
applied to these businesses. Second, an opportunity for simplification
was lost because the tax consequences of operating a business under
Subehapter S for corporations and Subchapter K for partnerships still
differ. More fundamentally, business owners would still be encouraged
to choose their entity classification so as to produce the lowest tax bill,
regardless of whether or not that entity provides the optimal
organizational structure for the business.'
b. Limited Partnerships and Master Limited Partnerships
New York ushered in the first limited partnership statute in 182265 and
soon other jurisdictions began adopting this business form. In 1916, the
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws drafted the Uniform Limited
Partnership Act, which was subsequently enacted by nearly every state.6
In 1976, the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws approved a Revised
Uniform Limited Partnership Act, which most jurisdictions have
adopted. 7
59. See Parker, supra note 58, at 421 n.103.
60. Pub. L. No. 104-188, 110 Stat. 1755 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). Sections
1301 to 1317 of the SBJPA of 1996 amended the Subchapter S rules.
61. See SBJPA of 1996, supra note 43, § 1301, 110 Stat. at 1777.
62. SBJPA of 1996, supra note 43, § 1302, 110 Stat. at 1777.
63. See SBJPA of 1996, supra note 43, § 1308, 110 Stat. at 1782-83.
64. In addition, the eligibility requirements would continue to be different. Some investors who
would otherwise prefer the corporate form would be forced to adopt a partnership or limited liability
company structure in order to obtain the desired tax consequences.
65. See Unif. Ltd. Partnership Act (1916) § I official cmt., 6A U.L.A. 313 (1995).
66. See t- Kurt Wilke, Note, Limited Partnership Control: A Reexamination of Creditor
Reliance, 60 Ind. L.. 515, 518 (1985). Louisiana is the exception. See iat
67. See Deborah A. DeMott, OurPartners'Keepers?Agency Dimensions ofParnerhop Relationships,
L & Contemp. Probs, Spring 1995, at 115 (Deborah A. DeMott & J. Dennis Hynes eds.).
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A hybrid between the classic general partnership and the corporation,
a limited partnership has at least one general partner, who, like all
partners in a regular general partnership, must have unlimited liability. 8
The rest of the partners can be limited partners who do not have personal
liability for the debts of the enterprise.69 Generally, a limited partnership
has been taxed as a partnership if it lacked at least two of the four
Kintner factors.7" This treatment persists even though the general
partners can actively manage the business. The limited partners, in
contrast, can exercise only limited control over the partnership and have
no day-to-day control over the partnership's business.7
In essence, the premise for allowing corporate limited liability is
continued in the limited partnership. Limited partners, like shareholders
in the corporation, have no management rights and no personal liability.
They trade their involvement in management for the security of limited
liability. General partners, on the other hand, like directors and officers
of a corporation, have management authority but also commensurate
personal liability.
The pass-through treatment of the limited partnership catalyzed the
emergence of "master limited partnerships": large, syndicated, publicly
traded tax-shelter limited partnerships in which the equity participants
enjoyed limited liability. The limited partnerships generally obtained
favorable pass-through treatment of income, gains, and losses by avoid-
ing "association" classification under the Kintner regulations. 4 Fearing
abuse and unrestrained growth of tax-shelter limited partnerships,
68. See Revised Unif. Ltd. Partnership Act §§ 101(7), 303 (amended 1985), 6A U.L.A. 144-45 (1995).
69. See Revised Unif. Ltd. Partnership Act §§ 101(7), 303, 6A U.L.A. 144-45.
70. See Larson v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 159, 185-86 (1976) (Dawson, C.J., concurring), acq.
1979-2 C.B. 2; Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-2(a)(3), -3(b)(1) (1960). In Larson, the court held that an
entity organized as a limited partnership that possessed the corporate characteristics of centralized
management and free transferability of interests, but lacked continuity of life and limited liability,
was taxable as a partnership. See Larson, 66 T.C. at 185-86 (Dawson, C.J., concurring).
71. See Revised Unif. Ltd. Partnership Act § 303, 6A U.L.A. 144-45. A limited partner's
relationship to the partnership mirrors a shareholder's relationship to a corporation. See Revised
Unif. Ltd. Partnership Act § 303, 6A U.L.A. 144-45. During the 1970s and 1980s, limited
partnerships became the principal vehicle for tax shelter investors. See Richard A. Booth, Profit-
Seeking, Individual Liability, and the Idea of the Firm, 73 Wash. U. L.Q. 539, 546 (1995).
72. For a discussion of the creation of the limited partnership association, see Edward R.
Schwartz, The Limited Partnership Association-An Alternative to the Corporation for the Small
Business with "Control" Problems?, 20 Rutgers L. Rev. 29, 29-64 (1965).
73. As to the limited liability of the limited partners in a large limited partnership, see Revised
Unif. Ltd. Partnership Act § 303, 6A U.L.A. 144-45.
74. See Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-2(a)(3), -3(b)(1).
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Congress finally addressed the problem in 1987 with the enactment of
Code § 7704, I which reclassified most publicly traded limited partner-
ships as corporations for tax purposes. 76 The life-and-death saga of the
master limited partnership provides a classic example of the intrinsic
dangers and frailty of a Treasury- and IRS-dictated organizational
regime: with one pen stroke the Treasury and the IRS eliminated the tax
advantages of the master limited partnership, leaving individuals who
had relied on this structure with hefty tax bills.
All in all, however, the standard limited partnership was only a partial
solution in the search for the perfect form of business organization.
While limited partners in small limited partnerships could enjoy the
security of limited liability, a general partner still remained subject to
unlimited liability. In addition, the traditional connection between
management authority and personal liability continued.
c. Limited Liability Companies
As the next step in the development of business organization law, the
limited liability company (LLC) represented a significant step in the
breakdown of the trade-off of investor passivity for limited liability.
Causing a minor business revolution over the past decade, the LLC was
created out of whole cloth solely to satisfy the limited liability/double
taxation conundrum.
In 1977, Wyoming adopted the first modern7 LLC act in the United
States, creating a new form of business entity that would provide both
limited liability and federal pass-through partnership-like income tax
75. See Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 10211(9), 101 Stat. 1330-403 (1987) (codified as amended at
I.R.C. § 7704 (1994)) (reclassifying certain publicly traded partnerships as corporations); see also
H.R. Rep. No. 100-495, at 947-50 (1987) (discussing classification and treatment of publicly traded
partnerships).
76. See IR.C. § 7704 (1994); see also I.R.S. Notice 88-75, 1988-2 C.B. 386 (defining publicly
traded partnership and setting forth transition rules for existing partnership in accordance with
§ 7704); Sheldon L Banoff, Avoiding Publicly Traded Partnership Status: Living and Dying with
Notice 88-75, 66 Taxes 561 (1988) (advising how to avoid publicly traded partnership status under
new IRS guidelines).
77. The limited partnership association, adopted in Pennsylvania, Michigan, New Jersey, and
Ohio in the 1870s, was arguably the LLC's unsuccessful ancestor. See Wayne M. Gazur & Neil M.
Goff, Assessing the Limited Liability Company, 41 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 387, 393-94 (1991). In
fact, the 1977 Wyoming statute utilized some language from the Ohio limited partnership association
statute. See id. at 395.
Washington Law Review Vol. 75:147, 2000
treatment.78 Florida followed with LLC legislation in 1982. 79 In 1982, the
IRS began a study of the LLC and suspended the further issuance of
private letter rulings concerning the classification of LLCs as partner-
ships for federal income tax purposes.8"
Initial concerns about the federal income tax classification of LLCs
were laid to rest with the completion of the IRS study and issuance in
1988 of a landmark revenue ruling granting a favorable partnership
classification for the Wyoming LLC.8' With the tax consequences of the
LLC more assured, Colorado and Kansas started the second wave of
LLC legislation by enacting statutes in 1990.2 Four states enacted LLC
statutes in 1991,3 ten did so in 1992, 4 twenty adopted legislation in
78. See Wyoming Limited Liability Company Act, ch. 158, 1977 Wyo. Sess. Laws 537 (codified
as amended at Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 17-15-101 to -144 (Lexis 1999)); Philip P. Whynott, North
American Trade Treaty Stimulates Interest in U.S. LLCs: A Historical Update, 1 Limited Liability
Company Rep. 93-106, 93-106 to -107 (1993). The LLC concept was introduced in Germany in
1892 by a law authorizing the formation of the private limited company, the Gesellschaft mit
beschrankter Haftung ("GmbH," or LLC). See Kristin A. DeKuiper, The European Limited Liability
Company-A Comparison of the Czech, Slovak and German Examples with the New American
Entity, 1 Parker Sch. J. E. Eur. L. 291, 291 (1994).
79. See Richard Johnson, Comment, The Limited Liability Company Act, I 1 Fla. St. U. L. Rev.
387, 387 (1983).
80. See Gazur & Goff, supra note 77, at 445.
81. See Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360, 361.
82. See Colorado Limited Liability Company Act, ch. 58, 1990 Colo. Sess. Laws 414 (codified as
amended at Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 7-80-101 to -1101 (West 1999)); Kansas Limited Liability
Company Act, ch. 80, 1990 Kan. Sess. Laws 585 (codified at Kan. Stat. §§ 17-7601 to -7656 (1995
& Supp. 1998)).
83. These four states are Nevada, Texas, Utah, and Virginia. See Limited Liability Company Act,
ch. 442, 1991 Nev. Stat. 1184 (codified as amended at Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 86.011-.571 (1997));
Limited Liability Company Act, ch. 901, 1991 Tex. Gen. Laws 3161 (codified at Tex. Rev. Civ.
Stat. Ann. art. 1528n (West 1997)); Utah Limited Liability Company Act, ch. 258, 1991 Utah Laws
991 (codified as amended at Utah Code Ann. §§ 48-2b-101 to -158 (Michie 1994 & Lexis Supp.
1998)); Virginia Limited Liability Company Act, 1991 Va. Acts, ch. 168 (codified at Va. Code Ann.
§§ 13.1-1000 to -1073 (Michie 1999)).
84. These 10 states are Arizona, Delaware, Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota,
Oklahoma, Rhode Island, and West Virginia. See Act of June 2, 1992, ch. 113, 1992 Ariz. Sess.
Laws 394 (codified at Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 29-601 to -857 (West 1998)); Act Effective Oct. 1,
1992, ch. 434, 68 Del. Laws 1329 (1992) (codified as amended at Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, §§ 18-101 to
-1109 (Michie 1999)); Limited Liability Company Act, Public Act 87-1062, 1992 III. Laws 2529
(codified at 805 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. §§ 180/1-1 to 60-1 (West Supp. 1999)); Iowa Limited Liability
Company Act, ch. 1151, 1992 Iowa Acts 238 (codified at Iowa Code Ann. §§ 490A.100-.1601
(West 1999)); Limited Liability Company Law, No. 780, 1992 La. Acts 2083 (codified as amended
at La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 12:1301 to :1369 (West 1994 & Supp. 2000)); Maryland Limited Liability
Company Act, ch. 536, 1992 Md. Laws 3286 (codified as amended at Md. Code Ann., Corps. &
Ass'ns §§ 4A-101 to -1103 (Lexis 1999)); Minnesota Limited Liability Company Act, ch. 517, 1992
Minn. Laws 1168 (codified as amended at Minn. Stat. Ann. §§ 322B.01-.960 (West 1995 & Supp.
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1993,85 ten in 1994,86 and one additional state adopted LLC legislation in
1995." Presently, forty-eight states have some version of LLC
legislation.8
2000)); Oklahoma Limited Liability Company Act, ch. 148, 1992 Okla. Sess. Laws 483 (codified at
Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, §§ 2000-2060 (West 1999 & Supp. 2000)); Rhode Island Limited Liability
Company Act, ch. 280, 1992 RI. Pub. Laws 1108 (codified as amended at R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 7-16-1
to -75 (1992 & Supp. 1998)); Uniform Limited Liability Company Act, 1996 W. Va. Acts 256
(codified at W. Va. Code §§ 31B-1-101 to -13-1306 (1996)).
85. These 20 states are Alabama, Arkansas, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Maine,
Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, and Wisconsin. See Alabama Limited Liability
Company Act, No. 724, 1993 Ala. Acts 1425 (codified at Ala. Code §§ 10-12-1 to -61 (Lexis 1999));
Small Business Entity Pass Through Act, No. 1005, 1993 Ark. Acts 2928 (codified at Ark. Code
Ann. §§ 4-32-101 to -1316 (Michie 1996 & Lexis Supp. 1999)); Connecticut Limited Liability
Company Act, No. 267, 1993 Conn. Acts 884 (Reg. Sess.) (codified at Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann.
§§ 34-100 to -242 (West 1997 & Supp. 1999)); Florida Limited Liability Company Act, 1993 Fla.
Laws, ch. 284 (codified at Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 608.401-.703 (West 2000)); Georgia Limited Liability
Company Act, No. 174, 1993 Ga. Laws 123 (codified as amended at Ga. Code Ann. §§ 14-11-100 to
-1109 (Michie 1994 & Lexis Supp. 1999)); Idaho Limited Liability Company Act, ch. 224, 1993
Idaho Sess. Laws 760 (codified as amended at Idaho Code §§ 53-601 to -672 (Michie 1994 & Lexis
Supp. 1999)); Indiana Business Flexibility Act, P.L. 8, 1993 Ind. Acts 1694 (codified as amended at
Ind. Code Ann. §§ 23-18-1-1 to -13-1 (Lexis 1999 & Supp. 1999)); Maine Limited Liability
Company Act, ch. 718, 1993 Me. Laws 2168 (codified at Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 31, §§ 601-762
(West 1996)); Michigan Limited Liability Company Act, No. 23, 1993 Mich. Pub. Acts 138
(codified at Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 450A101-.5200 (West Supp. 1999)); Missouri Limited
Liability Company Act, 1993 Mo. Laws 965 (codified at Mo. Ann. Stat. §§ 347.010-.740 (West
Supp. 1999)); Montana Limited Liability Company Act, ch. 120, 1993 Mont. Laws 269 (codified at
Mont. Code Ann. §§ 35-8-101 to -1307 (1999)); Limited Liability Company Act, LB 121, 1993 Neb.
Laws 333 (codified as amended at Neb. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 21-2601 to -2653 (Lexis 1999)); Act of
June 23, 1993, ch. 313, 1993 N.H. Laws 323 (codified at N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 304-C:1 to :85
(Michie 1995 & Lexis Supp. 1999)); New Jersey Limited Liability Company Act, ch. 210, 1993 N.J.
Laws 1215 (codified at N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 42:2B-1 to -70 (West Supp. 1999)); Limited Liability
Company Act, ch. 280, 1993 N.M. Laws 2753 (codified as amended at N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 53-19-1
to -74 (Michie 1993 & Supp. 1999)); North Carolina Limited Liability Company Act, ch. 354, 1993
N.C. Sess. Laws 1080 (codified at N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 57C-1-01 to -10-07 (Michie 1993 & Lexis
Supp. 1999)); North Dakota Limited Liability Company Act, cl. 92, 1993 N.D. Laws 390 (codified
at N.D. Cent. Code §§ 10-32-01 to -156 (Michie 1995 & Lexis Supp. 1999)); Oregon Limited
Liability Company Act, ch. 173, 1993 Or. Laws 435 (codified at Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 63.001-.990
(1997)); Act of March 13, 1993, ch. 344, 1993 S.D. Laws 535 (codified at S.D. Codified Laws
§§ 47-34-1 to -59 (Lexis Supp. 1999)); Act of December 14, 1993, ch. 112, 1993 Wis. Laws 708
(codified at Wis. Stat. Ann. §§ 183.0102-.1305 (West Supp. 1999)).
86. These 10 states are Alaska, California, Kentucky, Mississippi, New York, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Washington. See Alaska Revised Limited Liability
Act, 1994 Alaska Sess. Laws 99 (codified at Alaska Stat. §§ 10.50.010-.995 (Lexis 1998)); Beverly-
Killea Limited Liability Company Act, 1994 Cal. Stat. 1200 (codified at Cal. Corp. Code §§ 17000-
17705 (West Supp. 1998)); Kentucky Limited Liability Company Act, ch. 389, 1994 Ky. Acts 1087
(codified at Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 275.001-.455 (Banks-Baldwin Supp. 1999)); Mississippi Limited
Liability Company Act, ch. 402, 1994 Miss. Laws 215 (codified at Miss. Code Ann. §§ 79-29-101 to
-1204 (West 1999)); New York Limited Liability Company Act, ch. 576, 1994 N.Y. Laws 1347
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Balancing limited liability with pass-through taxation, the LLC
represents a new hybrid to the business entity montage. Unlike a limited
partnership, in which a general partner has personal liability to third
parties for the recourse debts of the partnership,89 all owners of an LLC
enjoy limited liability-no owner bears personal responsibility for LLC
debts.9" Moreover, many LLC codes derive from a partnership
organizational framework,9" with presumptive management by the
owners/members. LLC statutes reflect both the form of entity that the
parties would have ultimately chosen9" and the need to ensure the
classification of the LLC as a partnership for federal income tax
purposes. To achieve this, LLC statutes typically allow multiple
members,93 the potential for dissolution upon the death or withdrawal of
(codified at N.Y. Ltd. Liab. Co. Law §§ 101-1403 (West Supp. 1999)); Act Effective July 1, 1994,
1994 Ohio Laws 634 (codified at Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 1705.01-.58 (Anderson 1997 & Supp.
1998)); Limited Liability Company Law of 1994, No. 106, 1994 Pa. Laws 703 (codified at 15 Pa.
Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 8901-8998 (West 1995 & Supp. 1999)); South Carolina Limited Liability
Company Act, No. 448, 1994 S.C. Acts 4856 (codified at S.C. Code Ann. §§ 33-43-101 to -1409
(West Supp. 1999)); Tennessee Limited Liability Company Act, ch. 868, 1994 Tenn. Pub. Acts 654
(codified at Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 48-201-101 to -248-602 (Michie 1995 & Lexis Supp. 1999));
Washington Limited Liability Company Act, ch. 211, 1994 Wash. Laws 1018 (codified at Wash.
Rev. Code §§ 25.15.005-.902 (1998)).
87. Massachusetts enacted an LLC statute effective January 1, 1996. See Massachusetts Limited
Liability Company Act, 1995 Mass. Acts 281 (codified at Mass. Ann. Laws, ch. 156C, §§ 1-68
(Law Co-op. 1996)).
88. See supra notes 78, 82-87. Hawaii's LLC statute became effective April 1, 1997. See Hawaii
Limited Liability Company Act, 1996 Haw. Sess. Laws 92 (codified at Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§§ 428-101 to -1302 (Lexis Supp. 1999)).
89. See Revised Unif. Ltd. Partnership Act § 303 (amended 1985), 6A U.L.A. 144-45 (1995).
90. See, e.g., Md. Code Ann., Corps. & Ass'ns § 4A-301 (Lexis 1999) ("Except as otherwise
provided ... no member shall be personally liable for the obligations of the limited liability
company...."); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 42:2B-23 (West Supp. 1996) ("Except as otherwise provided...
the debts, obligations and liabilities of a limited liability company, whether arising in contract, tort or
otherwise shall be solely the debts, obligations and liabilities of the limited liability company.., no
member... shall be obligated personally ... ").
91. For a bibliography of LLC literature, see Daniel J. Jacobs, Limited Liability Companies
(LLCs): A Selective Bibliography with Statutory References, 49 Rec. Ass'n B. City N.Y. 901 (1994).
See also Gazur & Goff, supra note 77 (assessing the LLC form); Robert R. Keatinge et al., The
Limited Liability Company: A Study of the Emerging Entity, 47 Bus. Law. 375 (1992) (comparing
LLCs to other business organization forms and analyzing state LLC statutes).
92. See, e.g., Scott I Anderson, The Illinois Limited Liability Company: A Flexible Alternative
for Business, 25 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 55, 103 (1993) ("LLCs, particularly member-managed LLCs, are
likely to be closely held .... ").
93. Several states-including Arkansas, Colorado, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Missouri, Montana,
New Mexico, New York, and Texas--permit one-member LLCs, although the federal income tax
classification of one-member LLCs remains uncertain. See generally Larry E. Ribstein & Robert R.
Keatinge, Ribstein and Keatinge on Limited Liability Companies § 16.19 (1995). The IRS will
Piercing the Veil
a member,' and the limitations on the transferability of ownership
interests, all to ensure the desired partnership income tax classification
under the Code.9'
This is not to say that the various LLC statutes follow a single pattern
or even that they will be a continuing force as a form of business entity.96
In fact, the emergence of the LLC does not represent a simplification of
business organization law; ongoing experimentation by legislative,
judicial, regulatory, and practitioner fiat will result in a complex array of
laws that simultaneously revisit issues already settled in other contexts
and address these issues anew.
97
The common link in each of the LLC statutes, however, is either
presumptive or optional management by the owners. The concept of
separating management authority and structure from limited liability is
gone. The LLC exemplifies a crossroads in the development of business
organization law. No longer is managerial passivity the price that must
be paid for limited liability.
d. Limited Liability Partnerships
The development of the "limited liability partnership" or "registered
limited liability partnership" (jointly LLP) as the newest form of LLE
highlights the breakdown of the final barriers between passive investors
and active managers. An LLP is first and foremost a general partnership
wherein the partners both own and manage the business. Like the general
consider a ruling request regarding classification of an LLC as a partnership for federal tax purposes
only if the LLC has at least two members. See Rev. Proc. 95-10, § 4.01, 1995-1 C.B. 501,502.
94. Although most of the LLC statutes use the term "dissolution," the term "dissociation" was
introduced in the Revised Unif. Partnership Act § 601, 6 U.L.A. 72-74 (1995). "Dissociation" is also
the term used in the Unif. Ltd. Liab. Co. Act § 601, 6A U.L.A. 471-72 (1995).
95. See Susan P. Hamill, The Limited Liability Company: A Midpoint Evaluation, 52d Inst. Fed.
Tax'n 1-1, § 1.02 (1994) (discussing classification of LLCs as partnerships).
96. See, e.g., Karen C. Burke, The Uncertain Future of Limited Liability Companies, 12 Am. J.
Tax Pol'y 13, 47 (1995).
97. Professor Rands states that the LLC's "emergence is an example of badly formulated tax
law," stressing that "the germinal point in the history of limited liability companies was the issuance
of Revenue Ruling 88-76, which interprets the long outdated Kintner Regulations and applies them
to a Wyoming state statute!" William I. Rands, Passthrough Entities and Their Unprincipled
Differences Under Federal Tax Law, 49 SMU L. Rev. 15, 32 (1995) (footnote omitted). Professor
Rands concludes that, at best, LLCs are a marginal improvement over current limited partnerships
and are less desirable than corporations inasmuch as LLCs are fraught with uncertainty. See id. at
36-37 (noting uncertainties regarding, among others, veil piercing, fiduciary duties, and member
requirements).
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partnership, there is no separation between the partners' roles as
investors and as managers. Almost as an aside, LLP statutes usually
contain a one-paragraph provision restricting the limited liability of a
LLP's owners if appropriate documentation is filed with the state.
The liability protection accorded LLP owners is not always as
extensive as that accorded their corporate counterparts.98 Some statutes
restrict the protection to limiting partners' personal liability for the
liabilities of copartners, without affecting liability for obligations of the
partnership. 99 Other statutes protect partners only against liability for tort
debt, but not contract debt.'00 In still other states, LLP amendments to the
general partnership laws have been adopted, limiting liability for all
types of activities and for all partnership obligations.'0 ' The IRS has
ruled that LLPs are partnerships for federal income tax purposes despite
such limited liability.0 2
By combining limited liability for general partners with the well-
established partnership law foundation, LLP legislation produced
renewed interest in the partnership form. The LLP is the perfect solution
for participants seeking a partnership structure with active control, but
with limited liability. Any thought of having to forego active
involvement in the business in order to obtain the protection of limited
liability has been eliminated. In some sense, the LLP has become the
98. Some of the LLP statutes apply only to partnerships of persons rendering professional
services. See, e.g., Cal. Corp. Code §§ 15001-15800 (West Supp. 1998) (limiting LLPs to
accountants and attorneys); Or. Rev. Stat. § 68.110 (1995) (limiting LLPs to defined professions).
But see Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 87.020.7 (Michie 1995) (stating that LLPs are not limited to
professional services); N.Y. Partnership Law § 121-1500(a) (West Supp. 1999) (establishing that
LLPs are not limited to professional services).
99. See, e.g., Va. Code Ann. § 50-15(2)(B)-(C) (Lexis Supp. 1998) (repealed effective Jan. 1,
2000). Under the Virginia statute, a partner is not liable for "debts, obligations and
liabilities... arising from negligence, malpractice, wrongful acts or misconduct committed ... by
another partner, employee, agent or representative [of the partnership]." Va. Code Ann.
§ 50-15(2)(B). A partner is, however, liable "for his own negligence, malpractice, wrongful acts or
misconduct, or for the negligence, malpractice, wrongful acts or misconduct of any employee, agent
or representative acting under his direct supervision and control in the specific activity in which the
negligence, malpractice, wrongful acts or misconduct occurred." Va. Code. Ann. § 50-15(2)(C).
100. See, e.g., Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 6132b, § 15 (West 1995).
101. See, e.g., Minn. Stat. Ann. § 323.14 (West 1999); N.Y. Partnership Law § 26(b) (West Supp.
1999); see also Robert W. Hamilton, Registered Limited Liability Partnerships: Present at the Birth
(Nearly), 66 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1065, 1087-102 (1995) (discussing Minnesota's and New York's LLP
statutes).
102. See Rev. Rul. 95-55, 1995-2 C.B. 313 (concluding that New York LLP is classified as
partnership for federal tax purposes).
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perfect business form: limited liability for all owners, pass-through tax
status, and full management authority residing in the owners.
3. The Demise of the Kintner Regime
The tax-driven strictures of the Kintner regulations spawned LLPs and
LLCs in virtually every state,"3 thereby necessitating the creation of a
whole new body of law with all the resulting uncertainty. It was
inevitable that something had to change-the lawyers had created two
business forms, the LLC and the LLP that provided limited liability
while avoiding double taxation.
On December 18, 1996, the Treasury capitulated and finalized its
revolutionary "Simplification of Entity Classification Rules," also known
as the "Check the Box" regulations, which became effective January 1,
1997.""4 The Check the Box regulations replaced the existing Kintner
classification regulations with a simplified regime that is elective for
certain business organizations. Stressing that under the current system,
"taxpayers and the IRS must expend considerable resources on
classification issues,"'"5 the Treasury and the IRS aimed "to replace the
increasingly formalistic rules ... with a much simpler approach that
generally is elective."'0 6
The Check the Box Regulations define "corporation" to include any
business entity that is formed as a corporation under state law or taxable
as a corporation under another provision of the Code. 7 The Check the
Box Regulations continue to highlight "publicly traded" status as a
determinative factor of corporate classification.' The result of these
changes is that a business is subject to double tax only if the owners so
decide-either by incorporating or going public.
103. See supra notes 77-88 (listing states that have adopted LLC statutes).
104. See Simplification of Entity Classification Rules, 61 Fed. Reg. 66,584, 66,584 (1996)
(codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 301).
105. Simplification of Entity Classification Rules, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,989, 21,990 (1996)
[hereinafter Check the Box Regulations] (proposed May 3, 1996) (noting that "since the issuance of
Rev. Rul. 88-76, the IRS has issued seventeen revenue rulings analyzing individual state limited
liability company statutes, and has issued several revenue procedures and numerous letter rulings
relating to classification of various business organizations").
106. Id
107. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b) (1996).
108. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7704 (1996).
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According to the Check the Box Regulations, if a business is
incorporated under a state's corporation law, it will be taxed separately
from its owners. All other forms of business organizations, including all
the other LLE variations, can elect to be classified as an association (with
entity tax status) or a partnership (with pass-through tax status)."° The
Check the Box Regulations provide a default rule that approximates
owners' expectations more closely by classifying any newly formed
business entity other than a corporation as a partnership."0 Under the
Check the Box Regulations, eligible entities that existed prior to the
effective date of the regulations and chose to retain their existing
classification did not have to file an election."'
While the Check the Box Regulations constituted a significant step
towards exalting substance over form, the long road that led to rejection
of the Kintner regime left business organization law with a variety of
LLE business forms, some of them brand new in structure and
terminology. Today, tax issues aside, LLEs exist so entrepreneurs can
engage in a particular business without fear of losing their houses, their
possessions, or their other businesses." 2 In this sense, statutes creating
LLEs are essential to a healthy marketplace because they encourage
newcomers to invest capital and to participate in business.' The almost
universal adoption of the limited liability company and the limited
liability partnership makes clear the states' desire to expand upon this
important policy decision." 4 State legislatures around the country, having
considered the underlying arguments both for and against limited
liability, elected to encourage commercial activity at the possible
109. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(a) (1996). "Eligible entity" is referred to in the regulation as a
business entity that is not required to be classified as a corporation under Treas. Reg.
§ 301.7701-2(b)(3)-(8).
110. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(a). Similarly, if that entity has a single member, it will not be
treated as an entity separate from its owner for federal tax purposes unless an election is filed to
classify the organization as an association. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(a).
111. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(a).
112. See Dwyer v. ING Inv. Co., 889 S.W.2d 902, 904 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994) ("One of the
fundamental policies underlying corporation law is the encouragement of business ventures by
providing for limited liability.").
113. See Clark, supra note 2, at 1-34 (noting in general that limited liability encourages investors'
entry into market, and that increased interest rates lenders charge to LLEs is efficient method of
distributing risk).
114. See supra notes 77-88 and 98-102.
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expense of creditors and others to whom a particular business may have
incurred obligations." 5
C. An Opportunity for Reevaluation and Reform
While limited liability was historically restricted to passive share-
holders in a corporation, the expansion of limited liability to LLEs,
where such passivity has not been required or expected, suggests the
statutory intent to divorce the question of limited liability from the
degree to which an investor controls an LLE."6 Indeed, while the
benefits of pass-through taxation certainly contributed to the popularity
of the new LLE forms, commentators agree that a major factor in making
these entities more attractive to businesses is their combination of
flexibility and security."7
Corporate limited liability promoted passive investment, but the new
LLE forms expect owner involvement in running the business. Because
the legislatures' purpose has changed from merely encouraging and
protecting passive investors to actively promoting business," 8 the
reasons for courts to pierce the corporate veil and disregard the limited
liability provided by the LLE form should likewise be reexamined. The
test for deciding whether to waive limited liability must be both
broadened beyond the mere formalities of corporate proceduralism and
narrowed to that evidence demonstrating that limited liability was used in
a way contrary to the legislatures' purpose in creating it. The liability
115. Some commentators and courts refuse to acknowledge the purpose reflected in this policy
decision. They continue, instead, to emphasize the potential negative effects of limited liability on
third parties rather than the positive effects of limited liability on the market. See, e.g., Franklin A.
Gevurtz, Piercing Piercing: An Attempt to Lifi the Veil of Confusion Surrounding the Doctrine of
Piercing the Corporate Veil, 76 Or. L. Rev. 853, 853 (1997) (arguing "[l]imited liability means
leaving creditors of failed corporations unpaid").
116. This new direction has been completely overlooked by some commentators who have
advocated for the application of the same piercing doctrine to LLCs and LLPs as has been applied to
corporations. See Shaun M. Klein, Comment, Piercing the Corporate Veil of the Limited Liability
Company, from Sure Bet to Long Shot: Gallinger v. North Star Hospital Mutual Assurance Ltd., 22
J. Corp. L. 131 (1996).
117. See William J. Carney, Limited Liability Companies: Origins and Antecedents, 66 U. Colo.
L. Rev. 855, 858 (1995) (suggesting that "[IRS] Ruling 88-76, which provided that a Wyoming LLC
could be classified as a partnership for tax purposes.., opened the floodgates, and LLC statutes
have now been adopted in nearly all the states"). That is, these LLEs need not satisfy the stilted
"corporate formalities" requirement to maintain their limited liability status.
118. See Phillip L Blumberg, Limited Liability and Corporate Groups, 11 J. Corp. L. 573, 604
(1986) (finding that role of, and justification for, limited liability has changed over time and that
"[t]he triumph of limited liability flows from concerns of policy").
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shield should not be used to protect conduct that runs contrary to the
promotion of business.
Any new test should apply equally to all forms of LLEs. Only LLEs
with small ownership groups are generally subject to creditors' attempts
to reach their owners' personal assets, primarily because it is in these
situations that the owners are less likely to follow corporate formalities
or to be able to finance the entity with substantial capitalization.'
Because no substantive differences between these small businesses
justify disparate treatment of their statutory limited liability, a single test
can address all the potential waiver situations likely to arise. A single test
would be easier for courts to administer, would encourage businesses to
choose their LLE form for business reasons, and would still avoid the
potential injustice of differing results based on different business forms.
The only reason for distinguishing among the three forms of LLEs120
is the additional operational formalities typically required of corpora-
tions. The observance of these corporate formalities is neither a relevant
nor useful factor even when the issue of piercing involves a corporation.
In almost all cases, the corporation could observe all statutorily required
formalities and still take the same action that would lead to the alleged
harm. 12  Moreover, the corporate formalities relied upon by courts to
disregard limited liability are not intended to protect creditors in the first
place.12 As previously noted, the new LLEs are almost entirely lacking
in required formalities.' By putting aside issues related to irrelevant
formalities requirements, a new test can be applied to all LLE forms, as
some LLE statutes envision2 4 and as some courts have already done."z
119. See Thompson, supra note 5, at 1047-66.
120. Corporations, Limited Liability Companies, and Limited Liability Partnerships.
121. See Robert Charles Clark, The Duties of the Corporate Debtor to Its Creditors, 90 Harv. L.
Rev. 505 (1977) (arguing inattention to formalities is irrelevant to existence and amount of harm
caused to creditor); see also In re Tax Indebtedness of Coppola, No. 91-CV-0910 (JBW) 73, 1994
WL 159525 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 1994) (finding that defendant's observance of corporate formalities
precluded summary judgment for government despite uncontested evidence of self-dealing,
inadequate capitalization, common offices and personnel, and owners' personal use of corporate
property).
122. These requirements, such as board meetings and minutes, continue to be important for the
LLEs' owners and possibly for the state agency charged with administering the LLE statutes, but
should not be relevant to the question of waiving limited liability.
123. See supra Part II.B.2.
124. Indeed, the Minnesota Limited Liability Partnership and the Colorado, Minnesota, and Texas
Limited Liability Company statutes all expressly allow "piercing" law developed for corporation to
be applied equally to new LLE forms. See Minn. Stat. § 323.14 subd. 3(b) (West 1998) ("The use of
informal procedures or arrangements for managing the limited liability partnership or conducting its
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III. FAILURE OF EXISTING PIERCING TESTS
To develop a test for determining when the owner of an LLE will lose
the benefit of limited liability, the place to start should be with the
courts' experiences over the years dealing with this issue in the corporate
context. The failure of courts' previous attempts to articulate a single test
for disregarding the corporate form and holding the owners of a
corporation responsible for the business's financial responsibilities has
resulted in a number of overlapping lists of factors that are passed off as
tests.'26 The relevance of these factors to the issue of holding an owner
personally liable for a corporation's financial responsibilities is question-
able and at times completely unexplored.' 7 Some courts have taken to
business is not a ground for piercing the veil of the limited liability partnership."); Colo. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 7-80-107(1) (West Supp. 1998) (noting that "the court shall apply the case law which
interprets the conditions and circumstances under which the corporate veil of a corporation may be
pierced under Colorado law"); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 322B.303 subd. 2 (West 1998) (finding that "case
law that states the conditions and circumstances under which the corporate veil of a corporation may
be pierced under Minnesota law also applies to limited liability companies"); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat.
Ann. art. 1528n (West 1997) (incorporating corporate veil-piercing requirements in actual fraud
cases).
125. See Gallinger v. North Star Hosp. Mut. Assurance, Ltd., 64 F.3d 422,427-28 (8th Cir. 1995)
(applying corporate veil-piercing test to LLC without comment); Middlemist v. BDO Seidman, LLP,
958 P.2d 486, 491 (Colo. Ct App. 1997) (relying on Colo. Rev. Stat. § 7-60-153(1) (1997) to rule
that party seeking to hold partner in LLP personally liable "must proceed as if attempting to pierce
the corporate veil"); Hollowell v. Orleans Reg'l Hosp., No. Civ. A. 95-4029, 1998 WL 283298 (E.D.
La. May 29, 1998) (ruling that, with exception of lowered formalities requirement, Louisiana
"piercing" law developed for corporations would be applied to LLCs as well); Abu-Nassar v. Elders
Futures, Inc., No. 88 Civ. 7906 (PKL), 1991 WL 45062, at *10-14 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 1991) (using
corporate veil-piercing test but refusing to consider formalities, observance of which was irrelevant
to any alleged harm).
126. See Richard v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 946 F. Supp. 54, 61 (D.D.C. 1996) (setting out four
different tests: "(1) the 'agency' test under which the plaintiffs must establish that the parent
exercised a significant degree of control over the subsidiary's decisionmaking; (2) the 'alter ego' test
which is founded in equity and permits the court to pierce the corporate veil when the court must
prevent fraud, illegality or injustice, or when recognition of the corporate entity would defeat public
policy or shield someone from liability from a crime; (3) the 'instrumentality' test under which the
plaintiff must establish that the parent exercises extensive control over the acts of the subsidiary
giving rise to the claim of wrongdoing; and (4) the 'integrated enterprise' test under which the court
considers (a) interrelations of operations, (b) centralized control of labor relations, (c) common
management, and (d) common ownership or financial control."). Note that each of these tests has
multiple incarnations and consists of additional lists of nonmandatory factors for the courts to
consider based on the facts of each case.
127. See, e.g., Laya v. Erin Homes, Inc., 352 S.E.2d 93, 98-99 (W. Va. 1986) (listing 19 factors);
Victoria Elevator Co. v. Meriden Grain Co., 283 N.W.2d 509, 512 (Minn. 1979). The Victoria
Elevator court listed, without ever analyzing, eight factors:
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listing all the "list tests" in their opinions before doggedly attempting to
synthesize them for the case at hand.
28
While the factors used on particular occasions by particular courts
vary slightly from test to test, the factors for each test fall into three
categories: procedural issues, capitalization issues, and equity issues. The
factors in the first category are irrelevant and the factors in the second
category are directly contrary to both efficient business practices and the
purpose for limited liability. Decisions grounded on the third category,
while initially more appealing, often operate at cross-purposes with the
LLE statutes themselves and undermine the certainty necessary for the
promotion of business.
A. Failure to Abide by Statutory Procedural Requirements
Corporations have a very definite legal structure: shareholders own
the business, the board of directors makes business policy, and the
officers and other employees carry out the day-to-day operations. With
these discrete corporate organs and a presumptive separation of powers
come certain formalities for action. Shareholders and directors typically
are required by statute to take action by some form of majority vote at
meetings held pursuant to notice requirements and at which a quorum of
participants must be present. These statutory formalities protect
participants within the corporate enterprise from surprise decisions or
action without consultation. Unfortunately, claims alleging failure to
abide by the formalities of a corporate statute predominate plaintiffs'
attempts to hold owners personally liable for the obligations of the
corporate enterprise.'29 While these requirements certainly win the
[I]nsufficient capitalization for purposes of corporate undertaking, failure to observe corporate
formalities, nonpayment of dividends, insolvency of debtor corporation at time of transaction in
question, siphoning of funds by dominant shareholder, nonfunctioning of other officers and
directors, absence of corporate records, and existence of corporation as merely fagade for
individual dealings.
Id. at 512. An unspecified number of these factors, combined with an element of injustice or
fundamental unfairness, would justify disregarding the LLE and holding the owners liable. See id.
128. See, e.g., Richard, 946 F. Supp. at 61-62 (examining agency, alter ego, instrumentality, and
integrated enterprise formulations); White v. Winchester Land Dev. Corp., 584 S.W.2d 56, 61-62
(Ky. Ct. App. 1979) (examining instrumentality, alter ego, and equity formulations).
129. Observance of corporate formalities is a factor consistently present in piercing cases,
regardless of the particular test applied by the court.
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popularity contest with courts, they are rarely relevant to the plaintiffs'
injuries in a given case. 30
Although state statutes set out procedures that corporate actors are
obligated to follow, the statutes themselves do not condition the
continuance of the corporate entity on observance of these procedures,
most of which are designed to protect shareholders from unfair treatment
by the directors or fellow owners.' Indeed, it is strange that statutory
protections for owners have evolved into an essential instrument used for
stripping them of their statutory limited liability. As one commentator
noted, "Unless the legislature designed the rule [requiring an annual
meeting to elect directors] to protect creditors-something which does
not appear to be the case with meeting formalities-there is no logical
reason to treat compliance with the rule as a quid pro quo for limited
liability.' 3 2
Courts often justify continued relevancy of corporate formalities based
on a "privilege" or "quid pro quo" argument, which rests on two
assumptions:
1. An LLE owner's failure to comply with statutory formalities
indicates the owner's lack of respect for the separation
demanded by the laws that are the basis of their limited
liability, and "the formalities are themselves an excellent
litmus of the extent to which the individuals involved actually
view the corporation as a separate being,"'133 and
2. Owners expecting to enjoy the limited liability provided by
the statute should comply with the demands of the statute. 134
The first assumption is both false and irrelevant. One empirical study
indicates that only those LLEs with the smallest groups of owners are
130. See Abu-Nassar, 1991 WL 45062, at *9 ("It is not at all clear on the current record whether
defendants were injured by any of the alleged violations of the Code.").
131. The one exception is the "excessive dividend rule" present in most corporate statutes.
Legislatures enacted these antidividend provisions to protect creditors from excessive dividends. The
courts have turned this on its head, however, ruling that the lack of dividend is justification to pierce.
See, e.g., Victoria Elevator, 283 N.W.2d at 512-13. It is not exactly clear how a corporation's failure
to pay dividends became a source of personal liability for its owners, especially in light of the tax
reasons for not paying dividends.
132. Gevurtz, supra note 115, at 870.
133. Labandie Coal Co. v. Blank, 672 F.2d 92, 97 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
134. See id. at 96-97.
Washington Law Review
prone to piercing. 3' In large part, this result occurs because these same
LLEs are most often the businesses in which owners are most
overworked, most likely to overlook formalities irrelevant to their actual
operation of the business, and least able to pay an attorney to keep track
of their formal statutory obligations. The failure of these owners to abide
by sometimes expensive, often unproductive, formalities is not good
evidence of misuse of a limited-liability statute intended to encourage
business.
In addition, the second premise, that the law is justified in exacting the
stiff punishment of personal liability where an owner fails to "respect"
the law, is grounded on faulty logic as well. If the state believes that
failure of a corporation's owners or other participants to observe all the
formalities required by law represents a danger to the public at large, it
should be able to proceed against the corporation or those involved and
secure some form of punishment.
The situation is entirely different when a creditor seeks to attach an
owner's personal assets. The failure of a corporation's owners to observe
corporate formalities has no relevance to an individual creditor's claim
against the owners, unless the nonobservance of formalities is causally
related to the creditor's harm. Absent such a causal connection, a court's
blind use of formalities is akin to holding a driver liable for an accident
that occurred in broad daylight because the headlights were not in proper
working condition.
If observance of certain procedural rituals was important to any
substantive basis for imposing personal liability on a business owner, one
would expect that observance of required formalities would be part of the
piercing test not only for corporations, but also for other LLEs. Instead,
just the opposite is true. The use of formalities as a factor for piercing
any entity besides corporations has been rejected by both judicial
decisions and statutes. 136
135. See Thompson, supra note 5, at 1047-66.
136. See, e.g., Minn. Stat. Ann. § 323.14 subd. 3(b) (West 1999) (establishing that "[t]he use of
informal procedures or arrangements for managing the limited liability partnership or conducting its
business is not a ground for piercing the veil of the limited liability partnership"); Hollowell v.
Orleans Reg'l Hosp., No. Civ. A. 85-4029, 1998 WL 283298 (E.D. La. May 19, 1998) (ruling that,
with exception of lowered formalities requirement, Louisiana "piercing" law developed for
corporations would be applied to LLCs as well); Abu-Nassar v. Elders Futures, Inc., No. 88 Civ.
7906 (PKL), 1991 WL 45062, at *10-14 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 1991) (using corporate veil-piercing
test but refusing to consider formalities, observance of which was irrelevant to any alleged harm).
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B. Undercapitalization
Courts often cite undercapitalization as a factor in their decision to
pierce the corporate veil.'37 Depriving small business owners of their
limited-liability protection because of their indebtedness runs counter to
the purpose of limited liability. Several business-reality-based reasons,
the corporation statutes, and the history of corporations all support
discarding undercapitalization as a basis for finding personal liability.
First, holding a corporation's owner liable because the corporation
incurs debt in excess of its assets fails to recognize the reality that most
businesses are highly leveraged.' Even from the first day of operation,
businesses often possess insufficient assets to pay their current debts:
lease obligations, startup loans, and lines of credit from suppliers. This
does not even take into consideration the liability a business could
potentially incur even in its first hour of operation (if the business's first
attempted delivery involved a horrible traffic accident, for example). It is
difficult to see how any modem startup business could be "adequately
capitalized."
Second, continuing to require a level of capitalization sufficient to
cover even approximately a business's debts inevitably closes entrepre-
neurial markets at the same time that the legislatures are attempting to
open them. If courts set minimum-capitalization requirements high
enough to prevent creditors from going unpaid, the same requirements
will operate as a significant bar to new entrants into the market.
Indeed, most legislatures long ago abandoned the minimum-
capitalization requirements that were once a standard part of every
corporation statute.'39 These statutes did not require corporations to
maintain capital reserves sufficient to cover their debt obligations, but
137. See, e.g., Victoria Elevator Co. v. Meriden Grain Co., 283 N.W.2d 509, 512 (Minn. 1979).
See also supra note 127 for a list of the factors used in Victoria Elevator.
138. The business world runs on leveraging-an emphasis on undercapitalization runs directly
contrary to the well-accepted idea that a business's value is not affected by whether it finances its
operations through the use of capital or debt. See Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, Corporate
Income Taxes and the Cost of Capital: A Correction, 53 Am. Econ. Rev. 433 (1963); Franco
Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of
Investment, 48 Am. Econ. Rev. 261 (1958). Modigliani received the Nobel Prize in Economic
Sciences in 1985, in part for these articles articulating the theorem that "neither the value nor the
debts affect the value of the firm." The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of
Alfred Nobel (Oct. 15, 1985) (press release).
139. These minimum-capitalization statutes were truly minimal. See Robert W. Hamilton, Cases
and Materials on Corporations 204 (6th ed. 1998).
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only to keep some minimal amount in relation to the amount of capital
owners invested. 4' Most of these statutes have been repealed. 4' The
repeal of statutory minimum-capitalization requirements for corpora-
tions, along with the absence of minimum-capitalization requirements in
the modem LLE statutes, is strong evidence against inferring a minimum
capitalization requirement for these statutory entities.
Finally, putting all these arguments to one side, it simply does not
make business sense to put more money than necessary into the
operation of a business. The greater the amount of capital invested, the
smaller the return on equity, and the less successful the investment. To
penalize business owners for operating with business acumen is a
mistake. A better system would require some amount of retained capital
or mandate some amount of business insurance. But the current system,
which haphazardly imposes liability on the personal assets of corporate
owners based on their desire to get the greatest return on their
investment, simply makes no sense.
C. Equitable Bases
Equitable arguments for revoking the limited-liability protection
afforded owners under corporate statutes fall into two distinct categories:
(1) policy arguments that it is unfair to allow owners to avoid debts at the
expense of a corporation's creditors, and (2) allegations that an owner
committed fraud or disbursed the corporation's assets in a manner that
was harmful to both the LLE and the creditor.
The second category, fraud or fraudulent transfers, constitutes a
legitimate basis for revoking an owner's limited liability. In contrast to
the open-ended, free-form use of these terms today, however, the focus
must be reconstituted in a clear test that requires specific evidence of
fraud or an owner's dishonest conduct in transferring the corporation's
assets to himself or herself or some entity in which he or she has an
interest (a conflicted exchange) for less than reasonably equivalent value.
In contrast, the first category of arguments is completely at odds with
the state legislatures' purpose in enacting LLE statutes-promoting
commercial activities. While more appealing than the corporate-
formalities and undercapitalization arguments, the question of who will
incur the loss when an LLE fails is a legislative determination. Once
140. See id.
141. Only seven states retain minimum-capital requirements. See id.
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legislatures adopted LLE statutes that provided limited liability for
owners, perceived unfairness to creditors should not be either a subject of
judicial discussion or the basis of a decision to waive an owner's
statutory limited liability.
Janos v. Murduck42 illustrates the need for a more clearly defined
equitable inquiry. In Janos, a closely held corporation declared
bankruptcy and liquidated its inventory prior to delivery of the plaintiffs'
prepaid order. 43 The court began by reviewing the corporate structure
and activities of the shareholders, holding that the corporation "did not
exist separately from Norman Murduck."' The court based its
conclusion solely on the fact that the defendant founded the company,
was both the president and sole shareholder in the corporation, did a
substantial part of the corporation's work, and approved the transaction
in question.'4 5
Turning to the question of whether the defendant unfairly used the
limited-liability shield against the plaintiffs, the court ruled that the
plaintiffs failed to present any evidence of intent to defraud or that the
owner used the LLE to benefit in any improper way.'" The court
nonetheless ignored the defendant's unrebutted testimony as to the
external sources of his insolvency, "'47 ruling that an issue of fact existed
as to whether the defendant used the corporate entity to deceive the
plaintiffs because he failed to identify affirmatively the business as a
corporation. 4 ' Finally, the court reasoned that a jury could find the
defendant liable for the plaintiffs' injuries because the plaintiffs "paid
full price to Norman for windows they never received [so that] Norman
caused [their injuries]."'49
142. 672 N.E.2d 1021 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996).
143. See id. at 1023.
144. Id. at 1024-25.
145. See id.
146. See id. at 1025-26.
147. See id. at 1025.
148. See id. Note that the plaintiffs did not allege that the defendant made any personal guarantees
or that they relied on him personally in any way. While an owner of an LLE who misrepresented his
LLE status would necessarily be liable, and it may be possible under certain circumstances that an
LLE owner could defraud a creditor by simply failing to identify its limited liability status, the Janos
Court specifically found no fraud was present in the case.
149. Id. (emphasis added).
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It is hard to imagine a decision more hostile to the idea of limited
liability. 5 ° After creating and running a business under a statute that
purported to limit his liability, the defendant owner was held liable
because he actively participated in the business operations, never
specifically told those he did business with that his personal liability was
limited, and went bankrupt when his supplier's ordering policy
changed.'5 '
The Janos court ruled that the decision to disregard the corporation
and hold the owner responsible for the business's debts is founded in
equity."' Any court making an open-ended equitable inquiry would
likely reach such a result because the very concept of limited liability is
inherently inequitable. The idea that the Janoses, and not Murduck,
should bear the loss when Murduck's business fails is contrary to the
rules and mores of our society that teach that people are responsible for
bearing their own misfortunes and should not pass them off on society at
large. The limited-liability provisions in the statutes establishing
corporations can be viewed as directly contrary to our cultural norms and
the common law that grew out of them. 3
Nonetheless, the legislatures of every state have adopted corporate
statutes with limited-liability provisions. Continued emphasis on the
inequity of LLEs' limited-liability status in the face of this near-universal
statutory adoption is a clear demonstration of the hostility of courts and
commentators to the policy decisions made by state legislatures. Such
continued analysis of the fairness of protecting owners over creditors is
akin to courts' continuing to rehash an issue about which legislatures
have already spoken. There may be good arguments on both sides, but
150. In fact, the case already has spawned just a decision. See G & S Elec. v. Soha, No. 18665,
1998 WL 488785 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 5, 1998). The trial court granted summary judgment in favor
of the plaintiff, piercing the veil, based on the "confusion" caused by defendant's signature as
president of the corporation. See id. at *2. The appellate court, citing Janos, held that defendant's
signature as president of Building Board Custom Homes, Inc., at most created a genuine issue of fact
regarding the defendant's personal liability. See id. at *1-2.
151. See Janos, 672 N.E.2d at 1025. A good corporate lawyer in Ohio might now advise a
majority shareholder of an LLE that to maintain limited liability, she or he should (1) not be
involved in the business; (2) not personally approve any actions that the business takes; and
(3) expressly tell all the LLE's customers that they will be left out in the cold if the LLE goes under.
Needless to say, the Ohio corporate statute does not make limited liability contingent on any of these
actions.
152. See id. at 1023.
153. See, e.g., Sven-Olof Collin, Bad Losers: An Investigation of the Morality of the Limited
Liability of Shareholders in a Joint Stock Company, 30 J. Econ. Issues 283 (1996).
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the basic decision is a policy choice already decided by state legislatures
and no longer open to debate. The legislatures that established the
corporate and other LLE statutes weighed these policy choices in
enacting the statutes, deciding that society in general would benefit more
through the promotion of business opportunities than through the
protection of contract parties.
Decisions like Janos render the limited-liability shield wholly illusory.
Because limited-liability shields are unnecessary where the creditors
enjoy the benefits of their bargains with an LLE, these courts are likely
to abrogate the benefits of the LLE just at the time when owners need it
most. All too often, a court's examination of the "equity" of a particular
case, whether it acknowledges the inquiry as such or not, results in a
disregard of statutory limited liability.
That is not to say that owners should never be held liable for the
financial obligations of an LLE or that courts are always wrong. A new
test is necessary to reflect both the policy decisions made by legislatures
in enacting LLE statutes and the real possibility that owners might use
the limited-liability shield for some purpose not intended by the
legislature. By focusing courts' attention on the specific acts that operate
to waive the limited-liability shield, a new test will encourage sound
business practices, facilitate the growth of business, and aid creditors by
waiving the shield when and to the extent that owners misuse the LLE.
IV. THE PROPOSED TEST: FRAUD, CONFLICTED EXCHANGES,
AND INSOLVENCY DISTRIBUTIONS AS GROUNDS FOR
WAIVING THE LIMITED-LIABILITY SHIELD
Under existing law, when the owner of an LLE agrees to take personal
responsibility for the debts of the LLE or fails to maintain the LLE status
in accordance with the statute," the owner has waived limited liability to
the extent of his or her personal responsibility. In these situations, the
owner expressly waives limited liability. The proposed test that follows
identifies when and to what extent a court should imply a waiver of
limited liability. By restating the issue in terms of the owner's waiver
rather than the court's factor balancing, the test more clearly identifies
the owner's own wrongful actions as the source of the owner's loss of
limited-liability protection.
154. For example, an owner may personally guarantee some of the LLE's obligations or may fail
to file required annual documents and have the entity involuntarily dissolved.
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A court should find an owner of any LLE to have waived the owner's
statutory limited-liability protection in three discrete situations. First, the
owner of an LLE waives the shield in toto when the owner uses the LLE
to commit a fraud (or personally commits a fraud to aid the LLE)
involving material misrepresentations of the assets of the enterprise. In
this situation, the owner is responsible for all of the LLE's debts.
In the second situation, an owner waives statutory limited liability
when the owner causes the LLE to transfer assets or incur obligations to
the owner or some entity in which the owner has a material interest (a
conflicted exchange) for less than reasonably equivalent value.'55 An
owner who engages in such transfers is automatically liable to creditors
for the amount transferred or incurred in excess of a reasonably
equivalent amount. Creditors proving that the conflicted exchange
substantially contributed to the failure of the LLE to remain a going
concern are entitled to recover the entire amount due from the personal
assets of the owner without regard for the amount of the overpayment.
Finally, if the LLE distributes assets to the owner, akin to a dividend
in the corporate context, in recognition of and as a return on the owner's
ownership interest, and the distribution substantially contributes to the
failure of the LLE to remain a going concern, creditors are entitled to
recover the entire amount due from the personal assets of the owner.
While the proposed Model Statute includes some policy judgments,'56
the proposal has two more important purposes for providing a reasonable
resolution of the issues addressed. The first is to encourage some
uniformity in the application of the piercing doctrine across the variety of
LLE forms by adopting a statutory formulation of the test. The second is
to suggest a model for both academic and legislative review, debate, and
potential adoption or modification. It is more important that the policy
issues behind the piercing doctrine receive direct and open consideration
than whether the proposed statute necessarily represents the best or most
acceptable resolution of those issues.
155. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
156. For example, our proposed statute limits recovery for tort claims. There is significant dispute
over whether limited liability in the corporation should apply at all to tort claims. Compare, e.g.,
Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate
Torts, 100 Yale L.J. 1879 (1991), with Joseph A. Grundfest, The Limited Future of Unlimited
Liability, 102 Yale L.J. 387 (1992).
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A. The Model Statute and Comments
PERSONAL LIABILITY OF LIMITED LIABILITY ENTITY
OWNERS
Subdivision 1. DEFINITIONS
A. Conflicted Exchange means a transfer of money or other
property from a Limited Liability Entity to an Owner of that
Limited Liability Entity (or to any other organization in which
the Owner has a material financial interest) in exchange for
services, goods, or other tangible or intangible property of less
than reasonably equivalent value.
B. Creditor is a person or organization to which the Limited
Liability Entity is indebted based on a contract or other
voluntary transaction between the Limited Liability Entity and
the Creditor. These Creditors include, for example,
employees, customers, trade creditors, and lenders. The term
"Creditor" does not include tort claimants or governmental
agencies seeking to impose statutory obligations.
C. Insolvency Distribution means a transfer of money or other
property from a Limited Liability Entity to an Owner of that
Limited Liability Entity (or to any other organization in which
the Owner has a material financial interest), in respect of the
Owner's ownership interest, that renders the Limited Liability
Entity insolvent.
D. Insolvent when used with respect to a Limited Liability
Entity means that the Limited Liability Entity is unable to pay
its debts in the ordinary course of business. Claims that are
unusual in nature or amount, including tort claims and claims
for consequential damages, are not to be considered claims in
the ordinary course of business for purposes of this Model
Statute.
E. Limited Liability Entity means any corporation, limited
liability company, limited liability partnership, limited
partnership, or other form of business organization formed
pursuant to an organizational statute providing full or partial
limited liability for the organization's Owners.
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F. Owner means any person or organization that, by reason of
an ownership interest, is entitled to share in the profits of a
Limited Liability Entity.
Subdivision 2. LIABILITY OF LIMITED LIABILITY ENTITY
OWNERS
A. Imposition of Liability. Except as expressly provided in the
organizational statute of a Limited Liability Entity or in other
statutes regulating the activities and operations of a Limited
Liability Entity, or by express agreement of the Owner, no
Owner of a Limited Liability Entity shall be personally liable
for the debts or obligations of the Limited Liability Entity,
whether in tort, contract, or otherwise, unless the Limited
Liability Entity is or becomes insolvent and:
1. the Owner, either directly or through representations
made through the Limited Liability Entity, fraudu-
lently misrepresents in any material aspect the assets
of the Limited Liability Entity;
2. the Limited Liability Entity participates in a
Conflicted Exchange; or
3. the Limited Liability Entity makes an Insolvency
Distribution to the Owner.
B. Extent of Liability. Liability of an Owner pursuant to
Subdivision 2.A. 1 is unlimited as to all Creditors who relied
on the misrepresentations. Liability of an Owner under
Subdivision 2.A.2 is limited to the unreasonable portion of the
Conflicted Exchange except that, if a Creditor or Creditors
proves that the Owner, at the time of the Conflicted Exchange,
knew that the Limited Liability Entity was insolvent or should
have reasonably foreseen that the Conflicted Exchange would
render insolvent the Limited Liability Entity, the Owner's
liability to all Creditors is unlimited. Liability of an Owner
under Subdivision 2.A.3 is limited to the amount of the
Insolvency Distribution except that, if a Creditor or Creditors
proves that the Owner, at the time of the Insolvency
Distribution, knew that the Limited Liability Entity was
insolvent or should have reasonably foreseen that the
Insolvency Distribution would render Insolvent the Limited
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Liability Entity, the Owner's liability to all Creditors is
unlimited.
Subdivision 3. ELIMINATION OF COMMON-LAW PIERCING
DOCTRINES
The common-law doctrines holding Owners of Limited Liability
Entities personally liable for the obligations of the Limited Liability
Entity, whether referred to as "piercing the corporate veil," "alter
ego," "instrumentality," or otherwise, are inapplicable in this
jurisdiction after the date of this Act.
Comments to the Model Statute
Scope. This Model Statute is designed to replace the case-by-case
common-law analysis typically undertaken by courts under the
rubric of "piercing the corporate veil." The Model Statute applies to
all Limited Liability Entities irrespective of their underlying
organizational statute and structure. The Model Statute
complements other legislation, such as fraudulent transfer law and
restrictions on corporate dividends, that invalidates certain transfers
but does not expose Owners to unlimited personal liability.
The Model Statute is exclusive as to Owner liability except for two
situations. First, the organizational statute for a given business
organization may provide for more extensive liability. For example,
the jurisdiction's limited liability partnership provisions could
preclude elimination of tort liability or could preclude elimination
of contract liability. In either event, or for any other liability
provision expressly contained in the organizational statute of the
Limited Liability Entity, the provisions of the organizational statute
would control. Second, other statutes of the jurisdiction, for
example, tax or environmental statutes, may expressly impose
liabilities on the owners of Limited Liability Entities under defined
circumstances. In that event, these other statutes control within the
scope of their terms.
Exclusion of Claims. By the adoption of the various Limited
Liability Entity statutes of this jurisdiction, the legislature has made
the determination that Owners of Limited Liability Entities should
enjoy the benefits of limited liability. The bases for waiving the
limited liability of the Owner pursuant to this Model Statute relate
solely to the actions of the owner in representing the extent of the
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assets of the entity or in making transfers or distributions to the
Owner or related entities.
Given this focus, two sets of potential claimants are left without
recourse under the Model Statute. The first set of unsatisfied
claimants are tort claimants or statutory liability claimants. Because
the claims of tort claimants or statutory liability claimants place no
reliance on the assets of the business or on the apparent validity of
transfers made by the business, these claimants have no basis to
compel elimination of liability for Owners of Limited Liability
Entities. If the legislature wants to make a policy determination that
certain tort claims, for example, product liability claims, or certain
statutory claims, for example, workers' compensation claims, can
be made directly against Limited Liability Entity Owners, the
legislature is free to do so. Alternatively, the legislature could enact
insurance requirements for some industries or bolster product safety
requirements. Absent legislative action, however, the courts are not
free to eliminate limited liability based on tort or private statutory
claims.
The second set of unsatisfied claims relate to government
enforcement of statutory liabilities. These liabilities can vary from
tax claims to environmental claims to social security claims to
antitrust claims. Once again, while the legislature is free to
expressly provide personal liability for Owners in these contexts,
absent such legislative action, the courts are not free to impose it
otherwise.
Passive Owners. The Model Statute's focus is on behavior that
either directly misleads creditors, involves self-dealing, or else
causes the Limited Liability Entity to become insolvent. Therefore,
passive Owners who do not engage in these activities or receive
Insolvency Distributions are not personally liable under the statute
even though more active Owners of the Limited Liability Entity
might be liable.
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B. Chart Showing the Statute's Operation and Burdens
CREDITOR CLAIMS PROOF REQUIRED EXTENT OF
LIABILITY
Fraud 1. Material Plaintiff's entire
misrepresentation loss (but no
2. Made intentionally or consequential
recklessly damages)
3. Upon which plaintiff
relied
Conflicted Exchange (1) 1. Transfer of LLE assets Unreasonable
2. To owner (or entity in amount of the
which owner has transfer
material financial
interest)
3. For less than reasonably
equivalent value
Conflicted Exchange (2) Items 1-3 under Conflicted All Creditors'
Exchange (1) plus that losses (but no
Owner knew or should have consequential
reasonably foreseen that the damages)
Conflicted Exchange would
render the LLE Insolvent
Insolvency Distribution (1) 1. Distribution of LLE Amount of
assets Distribution
2. To owner (or entity in
which owner has
material financial
interest)
3. That renders the LLE
insolvent
Insolvency Distribution (2) Items 1-3 under Insolvency All Creditors'
Distribution (1) plus that losses (but no
Owner knew or should have consequential
reasonably foreseen that the damages)
Conflicted Exchange would
render the LLE Insolvent
C. Applying the Test to Common Circumstances
1. Fraud
Fraud serves as an important basis for imposing unlimited personal
liability. Fraud involves an intentional misrepresentation of a material
fact upon which someone relies in taking some action or refraining from
taking some action. If the owners of the LLE misrepresent the assets
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available for the operation of the business and the payment of its debts,
then creditors cannot make rational business decisions on whether to deal
with the LLE. Misrepresenting the existence or value of assets on
company financial statements may be the most usual behavior of this
type.
Victoria Elevator Co. v. Meriden Grain Co. 57 provides a typical
example of fraud in which the Model Statute would impose personal
liability on the owner for the debts of the business. In Victoria Elevator,
an owner operated a business as a sole proprietorship and then took on
two partners and incorporated.'58 The consideration for the issuance to
him of the corporation's shares was to be the transfer of land, equipment,
and other assets to the corporation. No transfers ever took place even
though he listed the properties as assets on financial statements reviewed
by creditors.'59 Although the Court relied on other factors to pierce the
corporate veil,"6 it would not have had to under the Model Statute. Use
of the Model Statute in this type of case would clarify the basis of
liability.
2. Conflicted Exchanges
Beyond direct fraud, creditors of businesses should be able to rely on
the fact that owners of the LLE are operating it in a legitimate manner:
that the owners did not transfer or cause the transfer of LLE assets
without receiving reasonably equivalent value in return.6 As long as the
LLE either retains its assets or receives reasonably equivalent value in
return, the LLE is whole, and the creditors' claims should be limited to
the assets of the LLE.
The owner will violate the Model Statute, however, if the owner
personally engages in an exchange transaction with the LLE, or transfers
assets among various entities in which the owner has an interest, without
returning reasonably equivalent value to the transferring LLE.
Legislatures did not enact the LLE statutes to protect the recipients of an
157. 283 N.W.2d 509 (Minn. 1979).
158. See id. at 510-11.
159. See id.
160. See id. at 512-13. The court employed a list of eight factors, including failure to observe
corporate formalities and nonfunctioning of other officers or directors. See supra note 127 for a list
of these factors.
161. State fraudulent transfer or conveyance law, or federal bankruptcy law, may void these
transfers, but these statutes do not address the personal liability of the entity's owners.
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LLE's gifts, thus the creditors should be able to reach these assets. If no
value was received, then the plaintiff/creditor is entitled to reach the
owners themselves (or those related LLEs), who received the benefit of
this "unjust enrichment." A plaintiff must have evidence of a transfer of
assets between the owner and the LLE. Under the proposed Model
Statute, absent fraud, this would be the essential inquiry. The court
would want to know where the LLE's assets went, who controlled these
entities, and what they received in return.
The proposed test applies to unreasonable asset transfers both to
owners themselves and to owner-controlled entities. Single ownership
groups often create multiple tiered LLEs so as to insulate the operations
of a business from the resulting income. As the operating LLE is the only
LLE likely to incur liabilities, the owners keep the accumulated income
secure from any creditors by removing it to the "holding" entity.
Just as they may in the case of an owner who is alleged to have
received the assets personally, plaintiffs may recover from other entities
in which a conflicted owner has an interest, on the ground that
reasonably equivalent value was not returned to the transferring LLE.
The defendant LLE can respond by presenting evidence of the goods and
or services it exchanged for the assets in question.
In Dania Jai-Alai Palace, Inc. v. Sykes, 62 an employee of a
corporation formed solely to operate the parking lot of an entertainment
and gambling facility injured a woman. 63 The Florida Supreme Court
refused to pierce the parent and sister corporations on the grounds that
the appellee demonstrated no affirmative evidence of fraud and that the
appellant was put on constructive notice that different LLEs operated the
Jai-Alai fronton and the parking lot in which she was injured."6
Under the Model Statute, there would have been no liability of the
owner under the fraud branch of liability. The Court would have
inquired, however, where the parking lot company's assets went and
whether value was received in return. For example, if the parking lot
company transferred its receipts and other assets to the sibling entity for
no equivalent value, the sibling entity would be liable. In addition, it
should be noted that, although the plaintiff's claim in Dania was stated
in tort, it arose out of a contractual relationship with the LLE. Under the
162. 450 So. 2d 1114 (Fla. 1984).
163. See id. at 1116.
164. See id. at 1115-22.
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Model Statute, a court should recognize this claim even though straight
tort claims would not be recognizable.
3. Insolvency Distributions
Not all distributions to owners, however, should be suspect. Corporate
distributions to shareholders, by their very nature, do not involve an
exchange of value. Businesses are started to make money. Penalizing an
LLE owner merely because the LLE provides a return to the owner
ignores this basic fact of business.
Legitimate liability arises, however, when the LLE owner receives
distributions that cause the LLE to become insolvent. This liability arises
because both the creditors of a business and the statute that created the
LLE presume that the LLE will be run according to two basic rules of
business: that the owners intend the business to be ongoing and the assets
of the business will not be distributed to owners unless there are
sufficient profits also to satisfy expected debts or claims against the
corporation. At the same time, businesses seldom fail for a single reason.
Indeed, legitimate owners would not continue to pay themselves
unreasonably when their business was suffering.
4. Extent of the Waiver
In light of the fact that an owner is entitled to reasonable
compensation for ongoing contributions to the business and is entitled to
reasonable distributions of profits, an LLE owner's liability should be
presumptively limited to that amount of compensation in excess of the
reasonably equivalent value of the contribution or the amount of the
distribution. A creditor can overcome this presumption and demand full
compensation for loss by demonstrating that the LLE would still be a
going concern but for the unreasonable compensation or distributions to
the owner.
In Klokke Corp. v. Classic Exposition, Inc.,165 a debt-ridden
corporation sold a substantial amount of its assets for over $1.2
million. 66 The corporation paid additional sums directly to the two
shareholders, one of whom ran the business while the other was a
165. 912 P.2d 929 (Or. Ct. App. 1996).
166. Seeid. at931.
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completely passive investor.'67 After paying off their immediate debts,
the two shareholders withdrew the remainder of the assets from the
corporation, a substantial amount of which went to pay personal income
taxes and a personal note.'68 The owners later designated these payments
as salaries, even though one of the owners was never an employee of the
corporation.'69
The corporation soon defaulted on the leased space for its remaining
operations.' The court found that the payment to the non-employee
owner
had nothing to do with any services that he performed or money
that he loaned.... That might have been unobjectionable for a
partnership, in which the partners retained their unlimited personal
liability; it is, however, inconsistent with maintaining the limited
liability that is part of the corporate form.
... [I]t [is] clear that the withdrawal was improper and that it was a
direct cause of [the LLE's] default. 7'
In determining the non-employee owner's amount of liability, how-
ever, the court relied on extensive accounting evidence showing that the
other owner dominated the LLE's business affairs and that several of his
business decisions contributed to the collapse of the business. 72 Because
the court found that the non-employee owner's withdrawal had not
caused the business to fail, the court limited the non-employee's liability
to the total amount of the payment for which he gave no reasonably
equivalent value.'73
Courts applying the Model Statute test would reach the same result,
but with a clearer analysis that would both promote uniform results and
provide clear direction for other LLE owners. The plaintiff creditors
would present evidence of the payments made to the owners, the owners
167. See id.
168. The note merely represented a promise to pay the remaining amount of his "share" of the
$1.2 million-the owner made no actual contribution in exchange for the note. See id. at 931-32.
169. See id. at 931 n.2.
170. See id at 932.
171. Id at 933-34.
172. See id. at 934-35.
173. See id.
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would present evidence that the amount of the payments was a
reasonably equivalent value for the owner's contributions to the LLE.
Should the owner fail to carry this burden, as did the owner in Klokke,
then the owner is liable up to the unreasonable amount paid. Should the
plaintiff also prove that the LLE would still be a going concern but for
the overpayments (as the plaintiffs failed to do in Klokke), then the
owner would be liable for the plaintiff creditor's entire loss. Owners
involved in neither of the challenged transactions could avoid unlimited
personal liability, as did the passive owner in Klokke; however, such an
owner would still be liable for receiving distributions that contributed to
the LLE's inability to pay its debts in the ordinary course of business.
In Dwyer v. ING Investment Co.,74 the court found that the LLE
would have been a going concern but for certain transfers and held the
owner liable without limitation for the creditor's claims.'75 In Dwyer,
ING, which operated a clothing-manufacturing business, agreed to make
installment lease payments for clothing-manufacturing equipment, rented
manufacturing space, hired workers, and purchased supplies. 76 The
owners of ING then formed a separate entity, Starline, for whom ING
agreed to manufacture clothing in return for only the bare cost of ING's
labor.' When ING defaulted on its debts, ING's creditors brought suit
seeking to hold the partners liable for those debts.'7 8 The court found:
ING lost its share of the profits from the sale of the garments
produced and to be produced under the agreement in order that it
could supply garments to Starline at a loss. No corporation acting in
its own best interests would enter into such suicidal arrangements.
The only reasonable inference is that it was being used solely to
benefit the controlling entity or individual and had no will, life or
existence of its own. 1
79
This case reflects the general principle that creditors of an LLE are
entitled to assume that the LLE will be run as a business for benefit of
the business and for the normal benefit of its owners. When the owners
plunder the assets of the LLE so as to bring about its demise, they may
174. 889 S.W.2d 902 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994).
175. See id. at 903.
176. See id.
177. See id. The partnership also used ING space for free. See id.
178. Seeid. at 904.
179. Id. at 905.
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not rely on the LLE statutes to limit either the existence of personal
liability or its amount. In extreme situations such as that found by the
court in Dwyer, the court is justified in waiving the statutory limited
liability in toto, and allowing the creditors to pursue the assets of any
owners or interested entities that received the plundered LLE's assets for
less than reasonably equivalent value.
V. CONCLUSION
The development of multiple statutory forms of limited liability
entities, while created mainly to minimize tax burdens and to provide
investors with insulation from personal liability, has provided an
opportunity to clarify the bases for imposing personal liability on owners
for the LLE debts. These new LLE forms also dispel any notion that
limited liability for LLE owners is linked either to owner passivity or
satisfaction of operational formalities. The proposed Model Statute ties
liability to responsibility by imposing personal liability on business
owners when their actions justify such liability. The use of the new tests
under the Model Statute will give honest business owners security in
knowing that their personal assets are not at risk, while preventing
fraudulent owners from hiding behind the shield of limited liability.
194
